ASIAN AFFAIRS ON NORTH KOREA Senior Researcher at the Institute for Disarmament and Peace Pyongyang - DPRK THE CHANGES IN NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS These past two years, since the historic inter-Korean Summit Meeting was held in June, 2000 and the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration made in Pyongyang, the inter-Korean relations which for some it was inconceivable to see moving positively have registered great changes. The changes are highlighted by the many on-going inter-Korean multifarious talks at ministerial and military levels, all these taking place in the limelight of cultural exchanges and cooperation in various fields of the civil society and the economy as well as family reunions taking place under the aegis of the Red Cross (1). But the security environment within which such enhancement of the North-South relations is taking place is so unstable and precarious that nobody can predict what may happen at any time in the peninsula (2). Having brought the DPRK-US talks to a rupture by its hard-line hostile policy against the DPRK, the present US administration listed our Republic as a part of an “Axis of Evil”. Thus, the United States were then breaking down even the fundamental basis for such talks by rebuffing our political system. At the same time, the US designating the DPRK as a legitimate target for what could be a pre-emptive nuclear attack, came with pronounced military threats against the country (2). Needless to add that it also launched all kinds of large-scale military exercises to justify an increase in its military presence in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula. Obviously the American hard-line policy to stifle the DPRK put, in the long run, a brake on the North-South talks. If peace and security on the Korean peninsula is naturally the unanimous desire of all the Korean people, there is also no doubt that the stability of the Korean peninsula is also important to the peace, prosperity and stability of the world, not to speak of the Asia-Pacific region itself. Yet lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula hinges entirely on a Korean solution to some fundamental issues. What are those issues? 1. The reunification. Division of our country into a North Korea and a South Korea was the work of outside forces. This division is at the core of the security issue that the Korean peninsula faces today. Hence, if one wants to address the root cause of the current problems, one must face the question of division and reunification. It is impossible to expect to solve the security issue on the Korean peninsula by merely instrumental exchanges and some kind of cooperation. Even, if as a result of such actions, the security of the peninsula was to improve to a certain extent, a small impact created by the outside world would turn the tables back for the worst and render cooperation impossible. One must bear in mind that in the past, North-South relations have always been impacted by the actions of others. This is not a peculiar situation due to the Koreans, for many other countries have also witnessed the same problem until the external forces seize to act. So there is nothing new in this remark (3). For the sake of a better understanding of our views, we can compare our predicament to that of an illness you need to cure. In order to do so, it is necessary to correctly diagnose its cause because simply dissipating the syndrome would be in vain. The disease would not be cured. For instance, a patient with stomach cancer taking painkillers to relieve his pain and avoiding a surgical operation, has no chance of being cured but only the expectation of dying. The solution to the security issue on the Korean peninsula presents the same similarity. You could alleviate the pain, but to solve it, reunification is a prerequisite. Only an unified Korea would offer lasting peace and stability in and around the peninsula. Some would agree, but they doubt it can be achieved quickly. To such a question I reply it is quite possible. There are at least two important factors to keep in mind when talking about it. Firstly, the fact that reunification is the uppermost cherished desire of the entire Korean people. The second factor is that the north and the south of Korea have agreed to the fairest realistic principles and solutions for such a national reunification to take place. They are the July 4th 1972 North-South Joint Statement and the June 15, 2000 North-South Joint Declaration. What are those principles? Independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity have been enshrined in several documents ever since May, 1972, when the great leader President Kim Il sung met the South Korean representatives on a visit to Pyongyang for high-level North-South political talks. The three principles of national reunification were discussed and agreed upon. They are in a joint statement signed by both parties known today by the rest of the world as the North-South Joint Statement of July 4, 1972. Furthermore the three principles of national reunification were reaffirmed at the inter-Korean summit meeting of June 15, 2000. Thus the parties have not changed their views or objectives. Why is it so important to stick to the principal of national unity and independence? In my view, this is because the Korean issue is solely a matter for the Koreans to master and organize. It is their country and it is their opinion that matters on all issues. Those who will live in Korea are the Korean people and there is a strong nationalistic underpinning in the process of reunification that cannot be handled by anyone else save the Koreans themselves. Pooling their strength together, the Koreans cherishing the desire for national reunification would make possible the realization of national reunification in line with the interests and desire of the Korean nation. Neighbouring countries need not be worried about such a desire for Korea as a nation has only peaceful desires and the wish to treat all nations on an equal basis. Furthermore peace and security in the peninsula would benefit all neighbours. Half-a-century-long history of partition more than substantiates the argument that the intervention of outside forces in the reunification issue creates only difficulties and increases the complexity of such task. That is why the Article 1 of the historic June 15, 2000 North-South Joint Declaration stipulates: “The North and the South agreed to solve the question of the country’s reunification independently, by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it" to emphasize once again that it is a national matter, not an international issue. But unfortunately, some have other ideas and believe that the Korean peninsula is an international matter (4). How could the North and the South be reunified into one nation, is the second question I would like to address. The obvious political framework of such a nation would be that of a federal state. It is in October, 1980 that the great leader President Kim Il sung set forth such a principle in the “Proposal of Founding the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo”, stating that the country should be reunited by founding a Federal Republic through the establishment of a united national government on the condition that the North and the South recognize and tolerate each other’s ideas and social systems. The two sides would be represented on an equal footing in the federal government under which they would implement a regional autonomy with equal rights and duties. President Kim II Sung later further elaborated on the reunification proposal, suggesting a step by step approach to the federation in such a way as to endow more rights to regional autonomous governments under the federal government on a provisional basis with the objective to enhance the function of the latter in the future. Why do we consider such an approach as the fairest and the most realistic one? First of all, because it reflects a reality. There are different systems in the North and South. It is pointless in a first step to believe that they could merge into one. If national reunification is realized through the federal formula, the regional governments would pursue independent local politics with equal rights and duties. As a result, the difference in the ideas and system would no longer be an issue at all, while the federation guarantees the principle of peaceful coexistence with neither side conquering or being conquered by the other side. A reunification conceived through a federation of regional governments is flexible enough to allow various and evolving political, legal and systematic arrangements under which the two systems can coexist legally in the framework of a reunified state. It would also resolve the military issue by itself. Secondly, not only the proposal reflects a reality but it would ascertain that the interests of the North and the South are equally represented. It laid down as the function of the federal state to respect and defend the interests of the whole nation alike. The principle of impartiality would be embodied in the operation of the federal state and the rights and duties of respectively the federal government and the regional governments would be defined and stipulated on the principle of impartiality. Thus it would not encroach upon or jeopardize interests of any class, strata or political parties, whether in the North or the South of the federal state. Thirdly, a federal system would conform with the interests of the neighbouring countries and the rest of the world as well as the desire of the world's peace-loving people. Since the regional governments of the North and the South would exercise independent policies under the guidance of the federal government of the country, the neighbouring countries would be able to maintain as they are the relations they wish to entertain for either the North or the South. Would the South be amenable to such a concept is clearly a key concern. But as I outlined earlier, there are no fundamental differences. In fact, the North and the South have more or less the same approach since the Article 2 of the historic June 15, 2000 North-South Joint Declaration stipulates that “The North and the South, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the North and the commonwealth system proposed by the South for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for reunification in this direction in the future”. The low-level federation established in the North-South Joint Declaration is based on the great principle of one state, one nation, two systems and two governments, under which the two regional governments are entitled to maintain intact the present functions and rights including the political, military and diplomatic ones, on top of which a national united mechanism is organized to coordinate the common national interests. The common denominator of the low-level federation and the commonwealth system is for the North and the South to complete reunification step by step while keeping intact the present respective authority and rights. Reunited under a federal formula, Korea would be an independent and neutral country. Such an institutional arrangement would solidly ensure a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. But is it going to happen? All depends on the approach and attitude both sides will take in making the necessary efforts for the realization of such a task. True to our late President Kim Il Sung’s lifetime intention, the respected General Kim Jong Il is working his utmost to achieve national reunification at an early date. On August 4, 1997, he restated “the Three Principles of National Reunification”, “the Proposal for Founding the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” and “the 10-Point Programme for the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for Reunification of the Country” which are the three Charters that were put forward by the great leader President Kim Il Sung. By doing so, he clarified the broad-minded and magnanimous position he was prepared to adopt with anybody from the South who would be prepared to work with him on national reunification. On April 18, 1998, he laid down the Five-Point Policy of Great National Unity, and reiterated his position to unite with all the parties in South Korea, including the ruling circles, government officials as well as opposition parties, big capitalists and military generals, under the banner of great national unity, if they value the national common interests and desire national reunification (5). Thanks to the respected General’s idea of national independence and patriotic bold decision, on April 8, 2000, an historic North-South Agreement on holding the North-South Summit Talks on the basis of reconfirmation of the Three Principles of National Reunification, was signed. It laid down the foundation for the historic Pyongyang meeting on June 13, 2000, and subsequently the adoption of the North-South Joint Declaration of June 15th, 2000. It created a bright opportunity for improving North-South relations with a view to realize national reunification by the Koreans themselves. But as mentioned earlier, while the Koreans were trying to solve the issue, the security environment deteriorated greatly, with the United States labelling our country as "evil" (6). If the first issue is the question of reunification, the second one, and basically its corollary, is the question of the American forces on Korean soil and the antagonistic attitude of the American administration towards our country. 2. If durable peace and security are to be achieved on the Korean peninsula, it is imperative for the U.S. to renounce its anachronistic hostile policy against the DPRK and withdraw its forces from South Korea. Despite the improved North-South relations since the publication of the North-South Joint Declaration, the security situation on the Korean peninsula remains unstable due to the U.S. hostile policy against the DPRK. Therefore, if a decisive turn is to be made in resolving the issue of security on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. must give up its anachronistic hostile policy against the DPRK and move towards improving relations with the DPRK. Withdrawal of the US forces from South Korea is a pressing issue in the DPRK-US relations, for there is no doubt that it is because US troops (7) are stationed in South Korea that our nation is divided after suffering the tragedy of fratricidal war and has yet to be reunited after half a century. No wonder the Korean peninsula remains the world’s hottest spot fraught with the biggest danger of war. How could it be different when the US keeps stationing a strong military force in South Korea while threatening our Republic by force of arms? It seems that every time the inter-Korean dialogue is moving forward something is happening to derail further progress. Is it intentional? I don't know but when at the beginning of the 90s the inter-Korean dialogue had reached a decisive phase, the US resumed the suspended joint military exercises “Team Spirit” to break the North-South dialogue and rendered impossible the implementation of the North-South Agreement. Then after the announcement of the June 15, 2000 North-South Joint Declaration, the US found it useful to stage large-scale military exercises in succession under various names such as the “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration” exercises and “Fowl Eagle” exercises with the mobilization of US troops stationed in South Korea to cool the favourably developing North-South relations for reconciliation and unity and reunification. Just in the last decade alone, the US forces stationed in South Korea perpetrated military acts against the DPRK on more than 438,000 occasions. The American military made South Korea its logistics base by constantly shipping into the country all kinds of modern armaments, thus aggravating an arms race in and around the Korean peninsula. Though the US is describing its troops stationed in South Korea as a “deterrent of war”, fussing endlessly about our “military threat”, a far-fetched idea in the light of the reality of the North-South relations today, all facts clearly prove that they are none other than an aggressive armed forces ready to support the US hard-line policy to suffocate the DPRK by dint of strength. As a result, it can be said that they are a main factor locking up the situation on the Korean peninsula and in the region. Whichever way we look at them, it is hard to find a valid reason for their presence. Their withdrawal is a duty that the US government should implement without condition. All the other countries who entered the last Korean War under the name of the “UN forces” have already withdrawn their armed forces from South Korea. Furthermore the stationing of the US forces in South Korea contradicts the Armistice Agreement calling for the pullback of all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula. And if one wantS to be as legalistic as the US seem to be nowadays with UN resolutions, one could state that their presence conflicts with the resolution of the UN General Assembly. At the 30th session of the UN General Assembly the resolution nș 3390B sponsored by the DPRK calling for disbanding the “UN Command” in South Korea and withdrawing all foreign troops therefrom, was adopted (8). Furthermore, the resolution nș 3390A sponsored by the US side states that the US forces are to be withdrawn after the arrangements are made for securing peace. Those arrangements are now fully provided with the adoption and the coming into force of the “Agreement of Reconciliation, Non Aggression and Cooperation and Interchange between the North and the South” in February 1992, the adoption of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994 and the publication of the historic North- South Joint Declaration in June 15th, 2000 (9) But the naked fact is that the stationing of the US forces in South Korea was the product of the Cold War, which today with its demise has lost its rational. Nevertheless, the DPRK and the US are still entertaining an hostile belligerent relationship, through no fault of our country. The crux is that without putting an end to such a belligerent relationship, it is impossible to achieve durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula. To conclude a formal peace agreement, the US forces' withdrawal must be attached to it. Then the belligerent relations that lasted for half a century would be terminated and all the pending problems existing between North and South because of such a state of affairs would be resolved by the Korean themselves. Nowadays in South Korea, the voices demanding the departure of the US military personnel are getting stronger every day. In America too, objection to the permanent presence of US troops ion the Korean peninsula can be heard. If the US government genuinely wishes the Korean people to be at peace, then it should create a favourable situation for the reunification and security arrangements to be implemented by withdrawing its troops from the peninsula without condition. Pyongyang - August 2002 Notes: 1.- A clear acceleration of such exchanges has been noticeable in September 2002. For example six lawmakers of the South led by National Assembly Vice Speaker Kim Tae-shik arrived in Pyongyang, Monday September 16th, 2002 for a seven-day trip. This is the first time that elected political personnel of the South are officially going in the North. Other members of the delegation are Reps. Bae Ki-sun, Hahm Seung-hee, Kim Sung-ho, Won Chul-hee and Jung Jin-seok, as well as Pak Jae Gyu, former minister of unification. The lawmakers are scheduled to meet leaders of the North's Supreme People's Assembly, and other senior officials to discuss opening talks between the legislatures of the two Koreas, which would open a new door to a political dialogue that was until now confined to the realm of foreign affairs officials at government level. At the same time, the Symphony Orchestra of the South Korean Broadcasting System led by its vice-president Kang Tae Yong arrived in Pyongyang at the invitation of the DPRK national reconciliation council. They were greeted at the airport by various high ranking officials of the North. The South Korean delegation said that the multifaceted exchange between the South and the North since the publication of the June 15 Joint Declaration was an expression of the ardent desire of the nation to put an end to the old era of antagonism and discord and open an era of reconciliation and cooperation. 2.- The Armistice Agreement between the two Koreas is in fact a shaky document because it was never implemented as agreed. The Agreement has 5 articles and 63 paragraphs, which can be grouped into three categories. The first group includes paragraphs which are no longer relevant because they were dealing with practical issues at the time of the armistice, such as Article 2 (Concrete Arrangements for Cease Fire and Armistice) or Article 3 (Arrangement Relating to Prisoners of War). The second group includes clauses which are important to the maintenance of peace after the truce, but which have been practically nullified and currently have no effect. Examples are in Article 2, Paragraph 13-d (Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition) and 13-g (Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned), Paragraph 19-35 on the Military Armistice Commission, Paragraph 36-50 on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Paragraph 60 on the amendments and additions to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question ("In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc…") and finally Paragraph 61 on the amendments and additions to the Armistice Agreement. ("Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides"). The ban on bringing arms into the peninsula from overseas after the truce was actually broken right after the armistice. As for the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement through dialogue, it was cancelled at the Geneva Conference, and the political conference, initially planned to be held within three months of the armistice has yet to take place. Of course, the revision and nullification of individual clauses of the Armistice Agreement occurred not by mutual agreement but on the basis of unilateral decisions. Excluding these two groups, there remains Article 1 (Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone). As we know, the Military Demarcation Line is still observed, and the so-called Demilitarized Zone is the most heavily militarized in the world. In short, of the many clauses of the Armistice Agreement, only the Military Demarcation Line is still observed, while the nature of the Demilitarized Zone has been transmuted, and clauses important to the securing of a solid state of peace were eventually either not implemented or nullified. A total management system or institution governing Korea's division does not exist on the Korean peninsula and without any institutional arrangements to secure a lasting peace, instability was inevitable. 3.- As Kim Ton Je is a North Korean analyst, some would regard his remarks as sheer fabrication. However, they have been corrobated by the South Korean newspaper Choongang Ilbo dated Sept. 13 ( after the present article had already been delivered to Asian Affairs) that the United States staged mock trainings for nuclear attacks on the DPRK in 1998. The fact was confirmed by a declassified document of the U.S. Forces which was made public by the Nautilus Institute for U.S. security and energy research, on Sept. 12, 2002. The document, dated Dec. 9, 1998, said the U.S. military authorities let air force planes based in North Carolina stage mock trainings for attack of nuclear weapons against the DPRK that year. F-15E fighter bombers belonging to the U.S. fourth airforce group involved in the mock trainings at that time were reported to use imitation nuclear bombs charged with concrete. Another released document said that the U.S. Forces worked out a plan in 1998 to promptly establish a theatre missile defence system on the Korean peninsula to swiftly destroy the DPRK's strategic facilities and block its defence with the patriot system and other ballistic missile interceptor systems. Furthermore, between 1993 and 1994 when the United States was swept in anxiety over the North's nuclear capability (although North Korea was then aiming at developing a nuclear power plant), the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) prepared a Second Korean War Plan (OpPlan 50-27-16). Through a multi-year review process, the emphasis of the scenario changed from a defensive stance against North Korea to an offensive one. Especially, OpPlan 50-27-16 laid out by Gary Luck in 1994, Chief in Command of USFK, was prepared for real war, not for operational exercise. As North Korea began fueling its first nuclear research reactor, Luck flew to Washington to join an extraordinary military meeting to prepare to fight in Korea. Secretary of Defense Perry and joint Chief of Staff Chairman, General John Shalikashvili summoned every active four-star general and admiral in the U.S. military, including several brought from commands across the world, to a Pentagon conference room on May 18 [1994]. The subject was how the entire U.S. military would support Luck's war plan for Korea, (...) The following day Perry, Shalikashvili, and Luck took the results of the meeting to the ultimate Commander-in-Chief at the White House, President Clinton. (The seriousness of the situation at the time can be exemplified in an episode following the adoption of the new Plan: when U.S. Ambassador Laney and chief commander Gary Luck agreed to proceed with plans for an immediate evacuation of American civilians from the country, Laney told his daughter and his three grandchildren, who were visiting at the time, that they should leave Korea by Sunday, 3 days thence). OpPlan 50-27 predicted that the U.S. would ultimately win the war with 545,000 U.S. troops engaging in a high-intensity war for 82 to 112 days or four months, at the cost of about 1 million human lives, including 80,000 to 90,000 U.S. troops, possible release of radioactivity over the Korean peninsula, Japan and Hawaii, a sea of fire across Seoul and the vicinities where 40 percent of the Korean population reside, complete destruction of the South Korean economy and trade, and war expenses of more than $100 billion for the U.S. alone and $1,000 billion in total for all allied countries combined. In short, should the U.S. choose the war option, it would have to bear an astronomical amount of damage and loss even with one-half of its military capabilities mobilized. Eventually, President Clinton had to make a swift turn to a diplomatic resolution and proposed to hold the third round of high-level talks with North Korea. The war line, which was pushed by then U.S. Joint Chief of Staff Chairman, General Colin Powell, (today State Secretary) who is recorded to have declared: "I am down to Castro and Kim Il Sung after the completion of the Gulf War", switched to diplomatic negotiation after reaching a climax with the OpPlan 50-27 war plan. Soon, Jimmy Carter visited the North and obtained a pledge from the North to hold a summit meeting with the South. 4,- In the 1990s, it was quite common to compare North Korea to East Germany. Since East Germany was unable to survive the collapse of the Soviet system, it was assumed that North Korea, without the Soviet support, would crumble. But it was the same speculation that led political analysts to consider that Deng Xiao-ping would not survive the events of Tianamen in 1989. 5.- Doh Jin-Soon, a South Korean scholar writes that the national division is often approached as a regional issue, or understood as a conflict between social classes or social forces. In the former view, the contemporary division is compared to historical divisions in the course of the establishment of the Three Kingdoms, of the Southern and Northern Kingdoms (Unified Shilla and Palhae), and of the Later Three Kingdoms period. In the latter view centered around left-right conflicts, the origin of the division is traced back to the conflicts between nationalist and socialist forces during the 1920s. Of course, regional differences between the northern and southern parts of the peninsula and conflicts between socialism and liberalism played a role in the national division, but such differences are not primary, but secondary. Korea's division was in nature a result of its contact with superpowers and with the world. (Doh Jin Soon on "Deduction of the National Division and the Premise of Reunification of the Korean Peninsula"). 6.- In a publication in Korean with the title meaning "Let us thoroughly implement the lifetime teachings of the great leader Comrade Kim II Sung on national reunification”. 7.- In a publication with the title meaning: “Let Us Achieve the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of the Country through the Great Unity of the Whole Nation”, 8.- Although President Bush has tried to elaborate many times on his concept of 'axis of evil", it has been derided everywhere as an ill-conceived description of the world order. In the case of North Korea, the Bush administration had to back down on some of its earlier hard-line statements. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Bush administration has been anxious every time other countries try to mend fences with North Korea. The most recent example of such an attitude can be found in the recent Japanese initiative. Although the United States indicated that they favored negotiations between Tokyo and Pyongyang, when Kozuimi met President Bush few days before the historic encounter between the North Korean leader and the Prime Minister of Japan, they were, as the Japanese Mainichi Shimbun, put it on September 12, world apart .Bush stressed that Washington could not turn a blind eye to North Korean production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, adding that Japan and South Korea might also be concerned about Pyongyang's military capability. "I think the U.S. is psychologically averse to a third country coming in the way of issues which Washington believes as their own diplomatic turf" a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said on condition of anonymity. North Korea argues that the US forces based in South Korea are illegitimate because their presence violates the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Today, they justify a lucrative business. Thus, in spite of the 1994 agreement signed between the US and North Korea, President Clinton has approved $9.5 billion worth of arms sales to South Korea since 1993, including McDonnell Douglas Harpoon antiship missiles, 200 Raytheon (formerly Hughes) Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket pods. North Korea has accused the U.S. of keeping North Korea as a hot spot to foster an arm race that would provide sales to the depressed US suppliers of weapons. The North Korean agency wrote, accurately it seems, that: "(The U.S) have chosen the Northeast Asian region around the Korean Peninsula as one of the hot spots. The bellicose elements of the U.S. military have been playing first fiddle in arms sales, which may lead to an outbreak of war". From 1994 to 1997 violence resulting in casualties erupted along the border every year. In 1996 South Korea went to its highest state of alert in 15 years, following an announcement by the North that it no longer recognized the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The North's statement was in effect only temporary; its impact was exacerbated by uncertainty over the North's shadowy nuclear program. But with 35,910 troops in South Korea and a commitment to send an additional 360,000 (under the U.S.-Korean Joint Operational Plan 5027-92) in the event of war, were all those sales really necessary? That the US seemed happy to focus on regional instability - to remain South Korea's sole supplier of strategic equipment became even more obvious to some analysts, when in 1996, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry demanded that the South cancel plans to purchase a Russian air-defense system. And in 2002, the Bush administration used diplomatic pressure to prevent South Korea from buying an French aircraft fighter, the Rafale from Dassault. demmed superior to the aircraft proposed by Boeing. Ultimately, the American government got its way, to the dismay of the South Korean Airforce. 9.- The 30th Session of the UN General Assembly held on 18 November 1975 adopted the U.S.' and South Korea's Joint Resolution 3390A and North Korea's Resolution 3390B simultaneously. The latter (3390B) called for dissolving the UN Forces Command as a measure to achieve a durable peace on the Korean peninsula. The former (3390A) also made a reference saying that it would enter into negotiations for making a new arrangement to replace the armistice agreement and dissolve the UN Forces Command if there was an alternative. The Resolution 84 (1950) of the UNSC, adopted on 7 July 1950, only recommended that all members providing military forces make such forces available to a unified command under the USA. Therefore, North Korea does not interpret the UN Command troops in Korea as a UN-affiliated organization such as the UN peacekeeping forces. The Geneva agreement was signed on October 21, 1994 after delegations of the governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (U.S.) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 agreed statement between the DPRK and the U.S. and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint statement of the DPRK and the U.S. to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The DPRK and the U.S. decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue: I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants. 1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) by a target date of 2003. 1-a) The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project. 1-b) The U.S., representing the consortium, will make its best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document. 1-c) As necessary, the DPRK and the U.S. will conclude a bilateral agreement, for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit. 2-a) Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production. 2-b) Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries. 3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities. 3-a) The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose. 3-b) Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed. 3-c) The DPRK and the U.S. will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW (e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK. 4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, DPRK and U.S. experts will hold two sets of experts talks. 4-a) At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project. 4-b) At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition. II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. l) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions. 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions. 3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the DPRK and the U.S. will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level. III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. 2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 3) The DPRK will engage in a north-south dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such a dialogue. IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. 1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty. 2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze. 3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK. It must be noted that if North Korea has indeed frozen its nuclear program, no plant will be ready for 2003. At the best, the LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) would be generating power in 2010. In the meantime, North Korea is badly short of energy and has to rely on the deliveries of 500,000 tons annually of heavy oil which is barely enough to cope with its needs. 12.- Yet, it is difficult to find any kind of consistency in the U.S. diplomatic ballet around North Korea. While the U.S. resorted to talks, not to hard-line military sanctions, in stark contrast to its reactions to Libya and Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s, each new President started his presidency by threatening Pyongyang's regime of annihilation. Right after the Gulf War, the Bush a Senior administration pointed at Kim Il Sung as the next villain to go after. However, without followers and under pressure from Japan, it ultimately decided to pull out nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula in mid-1991. This led to talks between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and eventually, to the signing of the Basic Agreement between the South and the North in 1991 and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in January 1992. The contact between North Korea and the U.S. was upgraded to a higher level, and a North Korean official Kim Yong-Sun met with Arnold Kanter, then undersecretary of state. During its early days in power, the Clinton administration endorsed a hard-line policy against North Korea, even preparing a war scenario (OpPlan 50-27-16), to which North Korea responded with a threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Then Clinton ended his presidency by sending Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, to Pyongyang. Bush Junior started his presidency by freezing all contacts. Since then, the administration had to soften its stance because Kim Dae-jung made clear when Bush visited South Korea that he was going to pursue his sunshine policy and that the American position was unacceptable. The Bush administration got again wrong-footed when Kim Jong-Il made a spectacular gesture towards Japan, during Koizumi's historic visit. By admitting that rogue military personnel had hijacked Japanese civilians in the 1970s and early 1980s (when he was not in power) and offering an apology for the incidents, the North Korean leader removed all obstacles on a normalization of the relations with Japan. The move left the Bush administration without any support in the region for its hard-line strategy. As a result an hasty visit to Pyongyang has been organized for Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly eraly October 2002. Kelly is not expected to engage in the displays of friendship that characterized the October 2000 visit to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. His visit is likely to be more restrained and without overt displays of friendship.To add to the inconsistency, the Under Secretary of State John Bolton in South Korea on Aug. 29 kept referring to Pyongyang's regime as ``evil,'' much as Bush did seven months earlier in his State of the Union address. Used to the the rhetoric, North Korea ignored it but it did not go as well with the South Korean people. He just succeeded in infuriating the younger generation a litlle bit more. | |||
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