ASIAN AFFAIRS ON TERRORISM Dato Mohamed Jawhar -Director General Institute of Strategic International Studies Kuala-Lumpur (Malaysia) WHAT IS TERRORISM? Terrorism means different things to different states. Its definition is heavily slanted to serve the political interest of the country concerned, which is the main reason why a universally accepted definition has been impossible despite over sixty years of attempts by the international community. If terrorism is rightly divested of the narrow political interests of different groups of states and is reduced to its essentials, that is terror applied through violent means on innocent civilians to achieve a desired political outcome (and therefore capable of being perpetrated by state and non-state actors alike), then terrorism is no stranger to Southeast Asia. International terrorism, that is terrorism networked across states and launched across borders from bases in other countries, is no stranger either. It certainly did not begin on September 11. Far from it. I will not go into the details of how many Southeast Asian civilians suffered in the hands of foreign state terrorism just in the last 60 years (not to mention the last 500), lest it offend some of us. Suffice for me to note just domestic terrorism. Every Southeast Asian country has been subject to domestic insurgent movements identified with terrorist acts and often labelled as terrorists. In many countries these terrorist movements have been defeated. Remnants continue though in Myanmar, the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philippines fighting between security forces and armed movements for autonomy in the south, not to mention communist terrorists, has taken over 120,000 lives since the Seventies. In Indonesia the liberation and separatist movements in Acheh and Irian Jaya, and sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi continue to be active. In Eastern Maluku and Sulawesi armed Laskar Jihad militia are accused of stoking sectarian conflict which has already taken more than 9,000 lives since it began just two years ago. But then what is terrorism? Indeed, in Timor, Timorese leaders of the terrorist groups which fought for independence against the authorities that terrorised them will soon become respected leaders of their country, with the active help of the international community (1). In Southeast Asia therefore terrorism is not new at all. Nor are the terrorist attacks of September 11 the first war of the twenty-first century, as some of my colleagues in the region are wont to faithfully repeat. But none of us can also deny that September 11 is indeed a watershed event, because of its single-day magnitude and its ripple effect throughout the world. In some parts of the world the ripples are in fact more like tsunamis and they are far from over yet. Old alignments and constellations are dissolving and a new geopolitical landscape is emerging. This paper therefore focuses primarily on Southeast Asia’s response to the September 11 attacks. The Regional Response So Far 1. Horror, Sympathy and Condemnation Like nearly all the rest of the world, Southeast Asian nations recoiled with horror at the brutal nature of the September 11 attacks. This horror swiftly turned to sympathy and grief for the victims of the massive tragedy. This vast outpouring of sympathy was recorded across the region in books of condolences in American missions from those holding the highest office to the common person, in messages conveyed to leaders and friends in the United States, in the news reports and letters addressed to the local media, and in other sundry ways. For a long moment all humanity across national, ethnic, religious and cultural divides stood as one. Then followed the condemnation, as universal as it was unconditional. In this regard the condemnation of the attacks by Muslims in Southeast Asia is noteworthy given the shared faith of the alleged perpetrators of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This condemnation was made all the more easier because the al Qaeda had hardly been heard of in Southeast Asia, and the Taliban was not recognised by a single regional government. The archaic, twisted literalist brand of Islam enforced by the Taliban also repelled the essentially moderate Islamist strain among the Muslims of Southeast Asia as elsewhere in the Muslim world. 2. Support for a Global Campaign against International Terrorism This overwhelming feeling of sympathy and support for the United States also resulted in all Southeast Asian governments joining, each in their own way, the global campaign against terrorism mobilised by the United States. They all sided with, not against, the American “us”, to use President George Bush’s famous phrase. All supported UN Security Council Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001 and Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001. 3. Regional Campaign Against Terrorism Equally importantly, all Heads of State and Government in the region who met at the 7th ASEAN Summit in Brunei on 5-6 November, 2001 adopted the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, wherein they expressed their deepest sympathy and condolences, condemned terrorism in the strongest terms, committed themselves to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts, and decided to strengthen existing counter-terrorism and anti-transnational crime efforts with further practical measures. Noteworthy in this regard are the ASEAN Leaders’ emphasis on strengthening cooperation at all levels to combat terrorism “in a comprehensive manner”, and their affirmation that “at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.” The Press Statement of the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEAN+3 Summit that followed goes even further (2). It stated that among the many ideas raised on how to effectively address the issue of terrorism was the need to deliberate the problem in a comprehensive manner including its definition and root causes. A Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime is to meet in April 2002 to discuss these and other proposals. 4. Concrete Cooperation with the United States Four countries are prominent in providing concrete assistance to the United States: the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Their prominence derives from American concerns in the following areas: - links allegedly forged by al Qaeda operatives with the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines in particular, and past support for it, - past contacts and meetings with third parties in Indonesia and on at least one occasion in Malaysia, - worries that the al Qaeda may shift its operation to the region, in particular to the Philippines and Indonesia, should it retreat from Afghanistan, - the strategic importance of Singapore and the Straits of Malacca to movement of US warships and logistic support from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, - anti-American sentiment among sections of the Muslim community in particular, in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand following the attack on Afghanistan beginning October 7 2001, and sympathy for the Afghan population and the Taliban following massive US airstrikes. Support for the US from these countries have taken the following forms: - intelligence exchange and cooperation, - surveillance of suspected groups, - supply and port service facilities in Singapore and, - protective watch over freighters and accompanying US warships carrying supplies and equipment for the war in Afghanistan. Given the perception of the al Qaeda as a common enemy, the US has also dramatically increased assistance to the Philippines, from less than US$2 million to US$100 million, besides giving advice on operations against the Abu Sayaf group (3). The US also offered troops, but the offer was turned down by President Arroyo Macapagal. Bilateral and trilateral cooperation among the Philippine, Malaysian and Indonesian authorities against linkages between terrorist and militant elements in their countries which were initiated before September 11 has also helped in the global drive against terrorist and militant elements following the September attacks. 5. Humanitarian Assistance The biggest security problem in Afghanistan both before and doubly more so after September 11 is human security. We only saw glimpses of this while the bombing was going on. Civil society organisations as well as the leading government and opposition Muslim political parties have organised fund-raising programmes, relief assistance and medical teams to contribute to the efforts to help in the humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the airstrikes and fighting that is unfolding in Afghanistan (4) and in the refugee camps in Pakistan (5). Similar efforts are also underway in Indonesia (6). 6. Support for Likely Peacekeeping Operations Malaysia and Indonesia have also indicated their preparedness to participate in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan under the UN flag if and when this is initiated. Their participation could be significant because as peacekeeping forces from Muslim or Muslim majority countries they would be more acceptable to the Afghans. Complications and Differences in the Regional Response So Far The regional response to the September 11 attacks outlined above however, mask some important complications and differences among the regional states in their response. Among the factors explaining these differences are first, the fact that the attacks on Afghanistan evoked relatively stronger negative sentiments in the Muslim majority states compared to the others, and second the closer links with the United States that some of the other states in the region possess. The complications and differences centre around some of the following issues (7: 1. Sympathy and Support for the Taliban from Islamist Groups In Indonesia and Malaysia and in Southern Thailand as well the spectacle of the most powerful and militarily sophisticated nation on the planet pounding one of the poorest and most defenceless nations, with all the attendant horribly euphemistic phrase called “collateral damage”, has evoked anger and resentment especially among the Muslims, but also among the average non-Muslim as well (8). Their response does not fall within the uncompromising dualism that the “either you are with us or you are against us” rule enjoins. They unequivocally condemn the terrorist strikes of September 11, but they also disagree with the US-led attack on Afghanistan and the growing casualties among innocent civilians who happen to be Muslim. In Malaysia this anger is strongest among the followers of PAS and some ulama or cleric groups such as the Ulama Association of Malaysia. Some of them have called for a jihad or holy war, while others have called for a boycott of American goods. These calls however have failed to evoke a response due among others to the strong opposition of the Government and the essentially moderate character of Muslims in the region. As far as I know not a single Muslim has answered the call of PAS. The reaction in parts of Indonesia have been even stronger, with anti-American sentiment running high among some radical and militant Islamist groups. This factor is forcing political leaders in both Indonesia and Malaysia to calibrate their response to the US-led attack on Afghanistan accordingly (9). 2. Opposition to US Attack on Afghanistan The large majority of Indonesians and Malaysians disagree with the attack on Afghanistan although they strongly support measures against terrorism and the need to bring the al-Qaeda to justice. Reflecting this sentiment, Prime Minister Mahathir particularly but also President Megawati have openly expressed their disagreement with the move to attack Afghanistan. Mahathir’s opposition derives from his concern for the loss of innocent civilian lives and the human suffering that would inevitably result from the attacks, and the belief that although the war against Afghanistan might be won the more important campaign against terrorism would be lost. Southeast Asia’s Future Response - Some Thoughts Contrary to perceptions in some quarters, Southeast Asia is not a major centre of terrorist activity, and terrorist activity has in fact declined over the years. There is more terrorist activity in Latin America, Africa or West Asia. There is also more extensive and more vicious terrorist activity in Europe. In the period 1984 to 1996 for instance, Southeast Asia had a total of 186 international terrorist incidents compared to 2073 attacks in Western Europe, 1621 attacks in Latin America, 1392 attacks in West Asia and 362 attacks in Africa. For the present significant terrorist activity in the Southeast Asian region is only found in Indonesia and the Philippines, though the word “terrorist” would have hardly been used to describe some of these movements pre-September 11. The more correct description would be movements for autonomy or independence, and militant religion-based groups engaged in sectarian conflict rather than in attacks against the state through the manipulation of terror targeted on civilians. The terrorist groups are essentially home-grown, and are not part of an international or regional terrorist network although quite recently elements from Malaysia have gone to Indonesia to participate in Laskar Jihad activities. In Malaysia groups which could be called terrorist consist of the al-Maunah group, the Jihad gang and the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysian Mujahidin Group). All three are very small groups alleged to have grand designs of establishing an Islamic state by overthrowing the government through violent means but with scant capacity. The largest group, the KMM, had 84 poorly armed members. Some of them however had been in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Soviet period. Most if not all of the members of all the three groups are now under custody, in detention or serving prison sentences. In the region too, while contacts with the al Qaeda had existed and may continue to exist, they are few in nature. Further, although some Malaysians and Indonesians had undergone training in Pakistan and Afghanistan and fought in the war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan - supported then by the United States - they are few in number. The Laskar Jihad of Indonesia for instance have admitted to 12 of its field “commanders” having fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian nations, in particular Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, must continue to take the extant and potential militant/terrorist activities in their countries as well as their links with international terrorism seriously. The inability of states to provide durable solutions to long-standing conflicts, as well as the continuing occasional emergence of new groups espousing militant causes are indeed matters of utmost concern. Similarly regional states should actively participate in the global campaign against international terrorism, because aside from their responsibilities as members of the international community dedicated to working together to preserve global security, they must take cognisance of the fact that the recruitment and organisational tentacles of international terrorism spread far and wide, and international terrorists can strike in any of their countries although their ultimate targets may lie outside the region. There should be no mistake: whatever their motivation and however they are fixated on any particular state or group of states, international terrorism is a threat to each and everyone. One group, just one terrorist group in any ASEAN country is one group too many. The thoughts below are focussed on what more Southeast Asian nations can do in their response to the campaign against international terrorism following the September 11 attacks. Their actions can be taken individually, in collaboration with other regional states within the context of ASEAN or outside it, and in the diverse international organisations they are part of, like the OIC. 1. Intensify Counter-Terrorism Operations Southeast Asian nations can contribute best to the campaign against international terrorism by cleaning up their own backyard first and making their environment hostile to international terrorists and their overtures towards local militants. In this regard, there is a great need to intensify both the efforts at addressing root causes as well as the symptoms. Among the areas that will need greater determination and effort will be the following: - socio-economic development in Southern Philippines. - economic recovery in Indonesia as well as more vigorous development in outlying areas. - greater seriousness and determination in restoring law and order and apprehending militant groups in Maluku and Sulawesi. Extraordinary legal and security measures are required if the sectarian conflict is to end, but the measures taken to-date appear to be wholly inadequate and delayed. - continuing efforts to find a political solution to the Acheh and Irian Jaya problems in Indonesia. 2. Enhance Security Capabilities. With the exception of Singapore and to some extent Myanmar, defence and internal security resources and capabilities in Southeast Asia are exceedingly low (10). This affects their ability to counter terrorism and act against terrorist acts within their own borders or mounted from abroad. Without seriously affecting their other important requirements, many Southeast Asian nations need to dramatically increase their military and security budgets and enhance their all-round military and security capabilities on land, on sea and in the air. In this regard arms control is not very pertinent, as they do not have much weaponry to control. Countries in the region should modernise and build with full transparency. Enhancing security capabilities however goes well beyond merely increasing firepower. They include measures to: improve morale, professionalism and discipline in the security forces; radically upgrade and protect capabilities; develop intelligence and surveillance capabilities including technical intelligence; and enhance propaganda and psychological warfare capabilities. In all these fields they have much to learn and benefit from the state of the art of the United States and other militarily advanced Western powers. 3. Launch Initiative in the Islamic World to resolve Muslim-based Militancy Terrorism can take sustenance among people of any faith. It often does. But uppermost internationally and in the region today is the threat posed by militant Muslim groups, including militant Muslims that take the terrorist road. The Muslim countries in ASEAN should initiate moves within the OIC and outside it to mobilise the Muslim world to confront this reality squarely, and dispassionately investigate the reasons why. It is in the interests of Muslim states and organizations around the world to respond positively, because the primary victims and casualties of Islamist-based terrorism have been Muslims themselves and not others. It is also in their interest because the image of Islam and Muslims as vicious, violent and cruel portrayed by the terrorists and magnified and skewed by the media, is contrary to the peaceful, tolerant, just and egalitarian character that is at the heart of Islam. The roots of militancy and terrorism in the Islamic world often lie in the domestic domain, in political oppression; absence of political representation; lack of adequate avenues to air grievances and secure redress; and corruption of the message of Islam and the term jihad by the ulama or clerics, teachers in religious schools or militant leaders. Militancy and terrorism also find easy recruits among the poor and the wretched. Where the roots are domestic, concerted moral and other pressure need to be brought to bear upon the countries and organisations concerned to undertake reform and other credible measures to address the problems. The Muslim majority countries of ASEAN, noted for their essentially moderate and pacifist way, can play a key role in mobilising the Islamic world in this endeavour. As part of this effort, ASEAN and more importantly its Muslim majority members should play a leading and constructive role together with the Western community in arresting the dangerous trend towards a global confrontation between the West and Islam. 4. Urge Reassessment of Foreign Policy in the United States The main target of international terrorism, including the September 11 terrorist attacks, is clearly the United States. In the period 1990 to 1996 for instance, one study (Philip W Yun, “International Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Characteristics, Motivations, Counter-measures") showed that US interests were targeted 72 times in Asia, far outnumbering the interests of other countries. In East Asia in the period 1984 to 1996 the frequency was 109 incidents out of 275. Just as the Muslim world must confront itself squarely, so must the United States confront itself. Why is it that the USA is the primary target? The angry assertion that America was attacked because the terrorists wanted to destroy “civilisation” and the American way of life, makes about as much sense as the terrorists claim that they are fighting for the glory of Islam. A major area that would need reassessment would undoubtedly be US policy in the Middle East. It is a major source of resentment and hatred among the Arabs and Muslims - and indeed criticised heavily in every other part of the world as well except in the United States and Israel. Washington’s frequent statements that it may intervene militarily elsewhere, including in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen or North Korea, are greeted with groans in many capitals. On December 5 2001, 114 nations attended a meeting in Geneva of countries party to the Geneva Convention. All 114, which included European states, demanded that Israel immediately refrain from grave breaches of the Geneva Convention in the Palestinian territory it occupies. The United States and Israel were the only two states to boycott the meeting (although a number of other states did not attend because they did not have missions in the city). The story on US policy towards Cuba is the same. On the same day (December 5) the UN General Assembly, meeting in New York, voted for the 10th year running to condemn the 40-year-old US trade embargo on Cuba. The vote was 167 to 3. The three against were the US, Israel and the Marshall Islands. Latvia, Micronesia and Nicaragua abstained. I can cite many other issues where not only Arab and Muslim opinion, but also nearly universal international opinion, is highly critical and resentful of US policy, but I want to tread softly here, lest I be misunderstood. Given the crucial relevance of some of these issues to the campaign to effectively eliminate terrorism, ASEAN nations acting in concert with other regional and international bodies must play a more credible role to persuade the US to reassess some of these policies. Uppermost will be policy towards the Middle East. ASEAN has a right, indeed a responsibility, to persuade the United States, because international terrorism driven by anti-US sentiment has serious negative repercussions upon themselves as well. 5. Entrench Adherence for the UN Charter and International Norms and Law ASEAN states can also do their part to stem the steady erosion of the United Nations as the primary authority for managing international peace and security. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognises the right of self defence, and permits measures to be taken in exercise of that right including attacking another country in self-defense. But that recognition and legalisation comes with important provisos in the Charter to prevent excesses and abuse. These provisos include: - clear and unambiguous Security Council authorisation of self defence measures to include attack of another sovereign country; - security Council authorisation is given only “until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security” - measures taken by members are to “be immediately reported to the Security Council" and, - such measures “shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council ... to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”. In other words the ultimate authority lies with the UN and not with any particular state. ASEAN and the international community need to act urgently to strengthen commitment to the provisions of the UN Charter because even as the Afghan chapter draws to a close, at least as far as military strikes are concerned, other chapters may well open in the future in Iraq, Somalia, North Korea and elsewhere. Global sentiment may then not be as tolerant and as permissive as in the Afghanistan case, and a highly volatile and dangerous situation could well develop. The point of no return creeps up almost always imperceptibly, and then it is too late. Notes ; 1.- Xanana Gusmao, who was the head of the East Timor Guerilla Falintil is universally expected to become the first president of East Timor when it attains independence on May 20, 2002. The head of the UN administration in the country, Sergio Vieira de Mello told the people of East Timor that they will be virtually self-governing from September 15, 2001 but that the UN will decide who will form the government and to accept a government of national unity after the August 30 elections for a constituent assembly or parliament. He indicated he had the right to appoint such a government, although he added that the new cabinet would "broadly reflect" the results of the elections. He reminded national council members that, until independence, he would retain ultimate executive authority under a UN Security Council resolution. 2.- The Declaration of the 7th ASEAN summit reads as follows: We, the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered in Bandar Seri Begawan for the Seventh ASEAN Summit, (…) - Deeply concerned over the formidable challenge posed by terrorism to regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development, - Underlining the importance of strengthening regional and international cooperation in meeting the challenges confronting us, - Do hereby (…), View acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world; Reject any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race; (…) Approve fully the initiatives of the Third ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) held in October 2001 to focus on terrorism and deal effectively with the issue at all levels and endorse the convening of an Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting and special sessions of the SOMTC and AMMTC that will focus on terrorism; Warmly welcome Malaysia's offer to host the Special AMMTC on issues of terrorism in April 2002. This meeting would represent a significant step by ASEAN to the United Nations' call to enhance coordination of national, sub-regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security; 3.- The Abu Sayyaf was founded by Abdurajak Janjalani, a Muslim scholar or "ustadz," who was among the 1,000 Southeast Asian Muslims who were supposedly recruited by American intelligence operation to help the Taliban in their guerilla war of independence against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. It was during this training that Janjalani and the other recruits from the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia came into contact with bin Laden’s group. When the Muslim militants returned to the Philippines, most of them joined the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the breakaway the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MNLF signed a peace pact with the Philippine government in 1996. The MILF, on the other hand, continues to talk peace with the Arroyo administration. In 1992, Janjalani returned to the Philippines and tried to build a religious base by espousing fundamentalist Muslim principles. It was with a raid in Ipil town in Zamboanga del Sur in April 1995 that the Abu Sayyaf made their presence known to the central government. After Janjalani was killed by government forces in Lamitan, Basilan on Dec. 18, 1998, the ASG openly pursued criminal activities in Mindanao and neighboring Malaysia. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest separatist rebel group in the Philippines, rejected the Taliban call for jihad initially citing that conditions necessary for religious war were not present. The MILF, which has been fighting for an independent Islamic state for over a decade now, later chose to remain mum on the American-led war but not without stressing that the attacks in Afghanistan were not without any rationale. 4.- Based on World Food Programme figures released 14 November 2001, the then number of recipients of food aid was 5,300,000. The UN estimate of potential need in future goes up to 7,500,000 (inside Afghanistan). The monthly requirement for 5.3 million people is about 53,000 metric tons. 5.- According to latest estimates by United Nations, Pakistan is hosting 3,346,161 Afghan refugees out of which about 1 million are children of age under 10. Some 1.5 million are living in old refugee camps in and around 22 cities of NWFP and Baluchistan while 1.63 million others are residing outside refugee camps. 6.- Indonesia hosted more than 120,000 refugees and asylum seekers at the end of 2000 (last statistics available). The vast majority, an estimated 120,000, were East Timorese. Of those, all but 10,000 were believed to be in the Indonesian territory of West Timor. They had been there since soon after East Timor gained independence from Indonesia in late 1999. They have not yet been repatriated. Furthermore, at the end of 2000, an estimated 750,000 to 850,000 Indonesians were internally displaced in 18 of Indonesia's 26 provinces. These included 215,000 to 285,000 persons in Maluku, 207,000 in North Maluku, 110,000 to 130,000 in Southeast Sulawesi, 73,000 in Central Sulawesi, 60,000 to 70,000 in West Kalimantan, 36,000 in North Sulawesi, 30,000 in North Sumatra, 20,000 in Java, 17,000 in Irian Jaya (West Papua), 15,000 in South Sulawesi, and at least 8,000 in Aceh. Thousands more were displaced elsewhere in Sumatra and on the islands of Nusa Tenggara. The numbers are increasing. About 6,000 Indonesian refugees from the province of Irian Jaya were living in Papua New Guinea at year's end. About 150 Indonesian Acehnese were refugees in Malaysia, while at least another 500 Acehnese lived there in refugee-like circumstances. Furthermore at the end of the year, Irian Jaya (the Indonesian part of New Papua) also hosted nearly 4,000 displaced persons from the Moluccas. Most were on a relatively inaccessible island off Sorong, on the western tip of Irian Jaya, while some 6,000 Irian Jayan refugees remained in New Papua. Then in 2001, the island of Sulawes was hosting more than 250,000 displaced persons. The largest number, as many as 130,000, were in Southeast Sulawesi Province, including the island of Buton. According to NGOs, conditions there ranged from fair to poor. In Central Sulawesi Province, some 73,000 persons were displaced as a result of Muslim-Christian clashes in and around the town of Poso. The clashes, though linked to local causes, were related to the religious violence in the Moluccas. The violence in Poso began in December 1998, with other significant occurrences in April and May 2000. The May events left 98 people dead and about 4,000 homes burned or destroyed. Most of the displaced in camps in Poso and Palu were Muslim. In Tentena, about an hour from Poso, most of the displaced were Christian. University students organized much of the assistance, which was also provided by churches, local governments, and a few international agencies. At the end of the year, an estimated 63,000 persons were internally displaced in the province of West Kalimantan on the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo. The vast majority of the displaced were ethnic Madurese from the coastal district of Sambas, which has experienced sporadic ethnic clashes since late 1996. The Madurese are from the Indonesian island of Madura, off the coast of East Java. In the 1960s, Suharto began moving many Madurese to West Kalimantan to alleviate overpopulation on Madura. Since then, a number of conflicts have broken out between Madurese transmigrants and indigenous Dayaks. The Dayaks blame the Madurese for the loss of jobs and tribal land. In 1999, ethnic Malays (who are predominantly Muslim, like the Madurese) clashed with the Madurese and enlisted the help of Dayaks (who are predominantly Christian). As a result, at least 200 Madurese were killed and some 35,000 fled to the provincial capital, Pontianak. During 2000, the number of displaced Madurese in West Kalimantan increased by at least 20,000 because of the return to Pontianak of displaced Madurese who had briefly returned to Madura. Finding conditions on Madura unsuitable, and enticed by the government's offer of relocation, they re-entered the camps to await such relocation. 7.- The talks between Afghanistan’s interim government and British officials ended late Sunday 30 December 2001 without the expected final agreement on the deployment of a peacekeeping force. "The talks are over, said the secretary to Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni of the interim Karzai government. There is no agreement. There is nothing to sign" he told AFP. The UN resolution calls for the deployment of a peace-keeping force that, for the first three months Britain will lead. Originally the force was expected to number 5000 troops. But the members of the new government have been trying to limit both its size and its duties while retaining troops of the Northern Alliance in Kabul, contrary to the Bonn accord. It is said that Turkey will lead the force in April but the conditions under which the peace-keeping force is supposed to work makes it unlikely that a broad number of troops coming from Muslim countries will join. The Western-led peace-keeping force is mostly confined to security duties in Kabul. 8.- Air raids conducted on December 29, 2001 by coalition forces on a village with an estimated population of 250 people, located six kilometers north of Gardez city in Paktia province killed at least 17 men, 10 women and 25 children, according to the UN's spokesman. The total civilian casulaties in Afghanistan will remain an unknown number, but the lower estimate is about 4,000 as of January 4th, 2001. 9.- On November 1, 2001, in her first state of the nation speech since assuming office just over 100 days before, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri urged the Bush administration to stop hostilities during the holy Islamic month of Ramadan, which started mid-November. In prepared remarks to the annual session of the country's top legislative body, President Megawati said prolonged military action "will not only be counter productive, but will also weaken the global coalition to wage war on terrorism." Megawati later renewed calls for the U.S. to quit the attacks on Afghanistan's people. Indonesia initially came out strongly in support of the US campaign to eradicate international terrorism. During a meeting with President George W. Bush in the White House in September, President Megawati condemned the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York as "the worst atrocity in the history of civilization." Since then, however, she has appeared to backtrack due to intense pressure from conservative Muslim parties which make up the largest part of her ruling coalition. 10.- An Islamic militant group's plot to target US military personnel and bomb US navy ships in Singapore started as early as 1997, Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng said January 13, 2002. Investigations into the alleged terror plans by the suspects are still continuing, said Wong. Few days before, the government had released details of alleged plans by 15 arrested terror suspects -- two of whom have since been released -- to bomb US-related targets in the island-state. The first was to target a regular shuttle bus service ferrying US military personnel from the Sembawang wharf to the busy underground train station shown in the videotape. Other plans include bombing US naval ships on Singapore's northeast coast. US, Israeli, Australian and British embassies as well as American companies were also listed as targets of the group. The 13 still under arrest are reportedly linked to terror suspect Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and eight of them were confirmed to have received training in al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The men were members of the Jemaah Islamiyah -- an Islamic group the Singapore government said was part of a larger network with cells in Malaysia and Indonesia. However, Indonesia's security forces were quick to announce that they had no evidence Osama bin Laden's network was active in the country, but police added it would be fairly easy for militants to slip into the huge archipelago. Arrests of Islamic radicals in Malaysia and Singapore have also focused attention on Indonesia, where the vast majority of Muslims are moderate. Many analysts believe that despite its many problems, Indonesia will not become a breeding ground for extremist pan-Islamic groups and add that radical Muslim organizations are not a new phenomenon in the country. | |||
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