ASIAN AFFAIRS ON TAIWAN Yen Wan-ching - Dy Sy General Straits Exchange Foundation (S.E.F) THE DPP's view on cross-strait relations (Summer 2001) Laurent Malvezin: (LM)- When we talk about the Taiwan Strait, we cannot help thinking of the factor of time. Apparently both sides do not have a sense of urgency to resume talks, yet time has a price. Nevertheless, some people in Taiwan think that the island being more and more Taiwanese, the status-quo in dealing with China is the best option. Others think that Taiwan is slowly being marginalized and that the more the government is waiting, the smaller the room for negotiation. What is your opinion? Yen Wan-jin (YWJ).- It is a multiple question for, when we talk about the Taiwan strait and its political dialogue, one has to take into account objective factors of appreciation as well as subjective ones. The dialogue is three-fold. It is cultural, economic and political. The cultural and economic dialogues play a crucial role across the strait and their impact should not be underestimated LM.- Indeed, but what about the third dimension: the political one? YWJ.- On the political side, the problems we face are the heritage of our recent history. It created between both sides major differences in terms of political system, ideology, culture, identity and nationalism. Meanwhile, both sides have developed their own domestic agenda. The Mainland has its problems and we have ours. Both domestic agendas have become a common constraint to find the path and mode of dialogue, because it has to happen when the time is ripe for both of us. LM.- Nevertheless time is not innocuous. China was poor and forgotten. The Chinese system, whatever it is, was not supposed to survive the twentieth century. The pundits were wrong and time turned out to be more profitable for China than for Taiwan, don't you think? YWJ.- To judge whether time is a constraint, my Mainland friends gave me two contradictory opinions: on the one hand, some say the Mainland side is in no hurry, so Taiwan, to reach a better deal with Beijing, should push back the political dialogue as far as it can. Others are saying the reverse. They warn that the Taiwan question cannot wait any more for it is a matter of historical pride and there is internal pressure. Hence the Mainland would not allow too much time before giving a definite resolution to the issue. These two different visions appear contradictory, but in fact reflect a double political strategy, the so-called “liangshou zhengce”. They respond, somehow, to the double challenge of Taiwan's domestic development. On the one hand, there is a political democratisation process going on in Taiwan which, when consolidated, will bring even more stability to the Taiwanese society. Once achieved, this new mould would be unbreakable. So time is not there in favor of China and there is a sense of urgency. On the other, Taiwan has to maintain its high-level of economic development and prosperity. It is a challenge and we may lose out. On these two aspects, democracy and economy, one could say that we are competing with the Mainland. So, those who advocate that time is on their side in the Mainland are taking into account the economic point of view, while the others see the political implication and the challenge that the Taiwanese political system poses to the reunification process. LM.- Do you really think that Taiwan competes with China, whether we refer to economics or to politics? YWJ.- Obviously, economic competition is more on top of the agenda for both sides. People who think that China has the luxury of time, think so because they are convinced that China will sustain its economic growth and soon become the main economy of East-Asia. The consequence would be that Taiwan, sooner or later, will have little choice but to seek more cooperation with the main economy of the region. In this context, the challenge for Taiwan has to be how to get the most benefit from increased economic cooperation with China, as well as with other partners all over the world –the United States, Europe - all these taking place in the context of globalization. LM.- Taiwan would not be alone in that process, but certainly would be the only economy without normal relations with China. YWJ.- This is why Taiwan has to find out a new necessary competitive advantage in its dealing with the Mainland. The same is true for mainland China towards Taiwan. We complement each other. For the Taiwanese economy, the Mainland means a huge market, a base for production and a source of cheap imported products. For the Mainland, Taiwan is mainly a source of investments and technology. We are also a gateway and a window for Chinese products to the outside world. LM.- Who, in your view, benefits the most in that economic partnership? YWJ.- It has to be a win-win situation out of which a mutual trust between both sides can gradually emerge. “Trust” is precisely what we need and what is important in our relationship, for it is the lack of it that make impossible currently to see any breakthrough. Furthermore there is a lack of knowledge on both parts. LM.- Does the lack of trust explain why Taiwan does not want to be recognized as a part of China? YWJ.- Beijing wants to impose on us the “one China principle”. Is that the right way to offer its trust, to unilaterally constrain the other side ? Let’s say that President Chen is responding favourably to this principle, would that mean that Beijing will trust the DPP government? I’m not quite sure. Trust is a question of time and maturity, we all need patience to establish it. LM.- Trust is definitely important, but it never comes on its own. There is a need for dialogue, but we have none. Your foundation was established to create opportunities for dialogue. What is it doing now that S.E.F. does not talk any more to its counterpart, the A.R.A.T.S (1)? YWJ.- We are willing to engage in new platforms of dialogue like APEC or WTO. For instance, once both sides enter into the WTO, we should work out a more systematic framework for trade relationships in accordance with the standards and regulations of the WTO. Thus, both sides could rapidly judge whether the other side gave his word on several points and respected it. LM,- From the Chinese point of view, Taiwan is a domestic issue. If Taiwan wants to bring the issue under international spotlights, whether it is APEC or WTO, it is unlikely to be accepted because Beijing and the international bodies themselves will not consider it as a proper platform to engage in a bilateral dialogue. YWJ.- Yes, Beijing will reaffirm its position on the fact that Taiwan status in WTO is like a regional representation of China. Taiwan would be annoyed by such treatment, but won’t move or protest, because we have to acknowledge that this is China. It is certainly a question of face and China won’t give an inch of margin on this principle. But that is just a verbal remark. The reality is different. China is entertaining economic and commercial relations with us, just like with other countries in the world. So some kind of dialogue will be established anyhow. Actually, the Mainland has already realized that it cannot embrace nor swallow Taiwan in the coming next years. For Taiwan, we have to increase our economic competitiveness and make sure that we can preserve the status-quo for the coming 8 years or so. This is a tough task for us because this status quo is not a static one, it is moving, evolving, and we have to adapt and never lose the right balance. LM.- What balance? As you say, the situation is moving, but not really in favour of Taiwan. Take for instance the outflow of Taiwan's private capital to China. It is on the increase while domestic investments are on the decrease. So what sort of status-quo are we talking about? Isn't it a bit unrealistic to hope that things would freeze for ever and dangerous to inoculate the population in a false sense of security? YWJ.- As far as national security is concerned, I think that the sole real benchmark we should use is our national economic performance. Now, in my view, the most urgent problem that has to be solved urgently is not the so-called “three links”, nor the level of our investments in China but rather a purely domestic problem: the level of the domestic investment and the economic environment. A better one would attract or keep investors operating in Taiwan. Furthermore, our industrial bases and structure are in a transitional period. Can we make the adjustment in due time? If we can't, not even the “ big three links” would improve the situation. What is required in fact is a strong commitment from the government to carry out the necessary financial reforms, in particular our taxation policy. A significant part of our laws is now outdated and not in line with what is done elsewhere. It makes us not only unattractive to foreign investors, but explains why the Taiwanese companies do not repatriate their returns on foreign investments. Any improvement would increase the likelihood that the returns would come back to Taiwan to be re-injected into our economy. LM.- Clearly, if we read between the lines, what you mean is that the capital outflow, going primarily to China, is a drain on Taiwan, and you expect to change the pattern by overhauling the Taiwanese economy. But at the same time, Taiwan is in political chaos and there is no plurality of voice to agree on a single blueprint. Is it realistic? YWJ.- To entertain economic and financial reforms while at the same time overhauling our political system is a tremendous challenge. When one is done after another, one has time to manoeuvre, but when the two come out at the very same moment, it is quite difficult, but that is where we are. LM.- Is the timing right? After all, Taiwan is primarily export-driven and its main customers, the United States and Japan are no longer the engines of growth they were, specially Japan that is also a large investor in Taiwan. YWJ.- Right but what can be done? Unfortunately for Taiwan, actually Japan is in bad shape when our finance sector and property market are trying to get out of their own “bubble” that the KMT regime built up for so many years. But we are not alone. Look around you in Asia, how many countries dare say now they have completely recovered from the crisis? Japan? Korea? They are still in a crisis. LM.- So you have basically three problems to tackle : the political and financial reforms, how to get more FDI and bring back the returns generated by the Taiwanese investments abroad, and finally how to revitalize the domestic economy after the crisis of 1997-1998 in the context of globalization. Has the new political elite of Taiwan enough experience and resources to tackle the situtaion? YWJ.- The new administration so far did not do enough but did far better than I thought possible. The DPP has never been a governing party. Even the KMT has to learn to play a new role, that of the opposition! I think that, provided we are able to undertake the reforms in the political sphere, especially in the legislature and the administration, we should succeed in maintaining stability in Taiwan and have the confidence to conduct the economic and financial reforms we need. LM.- For a long while, during the KMT tenure, the government and the business community were working hand in hand. Far from being a free market with little governmental interference, Taiwan was exactly the contrary. Can the government pull out of the market economy and let the market rule when the business community is just moving more and more assets to the Mainland? YWJ.- I agree with your statement. The government is everywhere in Taiwan. We have great businessmen. So let us give them less trouble, and that’s it. LM.- Here we come back full circle on the question of the cross-strait relations. You say, give them less trouble, but they are not free to do what they want with China which will become the economic partner of Taiwan, if the current trend goes on. Restrictions still exist and the “besieged mentality” in Taiwan is still there. Isn't the sign that Taiwan is facing mounting difficulties and does not have a clear mind about what to do next? YWJ.- China is fully aware of our difficulties. But as far as internal problems are concerned, we are not alone. China will face big challenges in the coming next months or so. The 16th PCC National Congress will take place in Autumn 2002, and before that it will enter the WTO. Both events will have substantial consequences for the Chinese political leadership and for the domestic economy. Its agricultural sector is bound to be affected. The SOEs, the financial sector will also be challenged. During that process, China definitely wants to keep a stable relationship with Taiwan, its priority being its domestic economic development and social stability. LM.- In other words, in your opinion, because of the WTO and the change of guards among the political elite of China, the so-called Taiwan question is at the bottom of the political agenda. Nevertheless China has clearly stated what it wants from the Chen government, and that is the recognition of the "one-China" principle. The non recognition of the “Chineseness” of Taiwan by the Taiwanese government would bring disaster (2). Yet, President Chen keeps using “huaren” to himself, but never “Chinese”. YWJ.- I think we need some time to move forward on this question of identity. And this evolution will be linked to the way Beijing puts this in its political discourse and rhetoric: for instance, if Beijing keeps it very narrow like: "there is only one China, and China's sole legal representative is PRC", that would pose a problem in Taiwan. LM.- Yes, but that is not what China has been saying for quite a while. YWJ.- I agree, and the more Beijing finds ambiguity or flexible interpretations of the meaning of what is China, the more likely the Taiwanese people would get used to that. For DPP, it has been a real move admitting willingness to talk on the "one China" principle and in that respect, I think both sides are on course to engage in a new dialogue. Of course, if Beijing keeps asking us to recognize first the "one China" principle, that would be problematic. I just worry that one day, after using all kinds of rhetoric, we will be blocked for once and for all, because all ambiguity and margin of manoeuvre would have been wasted ! Impossible to “walk down the stairs after reaching the peak” any more, as we say in Chinese. LM.- Why don't you want to go along the 1992 consensus that was reached on the issue (3)? YWJ.- Well, it wasn’t really a consensus in the sense that Beijing did not express publicly and irrevocably that it would accept the dialogue if Taiwan accepts that formula. The most important thing is to try to find out something that both sides would accept, something vague, some kind of common ground to allow moving forward. Asian people do have this wisdom and imagination to do so. LM.- Can't we think that the President Chen has cornered himself and does not know out to get out of his past rhetoric without losing political credibility among his supporters? YWJ.- Since last year’s elections, President Chen did not attend any of the DPP’s meetings. He does not intervene in the decision making process of the party. It is important to recognise that he has completely shifted his role for the sole benefit of the presidency of the ROC. He is above the parties and no longer represents a political party. Lastly, his platform and the DPP’s programme have both been significantly altered (4). LM.- But how far can he go without major problems with the DPP? YWJ.- The DPP supports Chen’s policies because it knows that he does not represent the party any more. LM.- That is quite a bizarre statement! In any case, President Chen will be backing the DPP during the coming legislative elections while Lee is trying to split the KMT. How comfortable are the grassroot members of the DPP with what's going on? YWJ.- They are not really comfortable and at the grassroots level, the DPP supporters are not makingenough effort. But, you know, everybody has to learn, the DPP as well: how to elaborate, pass policies, how to communicate with the masses, the opposition parties, the media. This process needs time, but I wonder if the DPP still has the ability to learn new things. This is my first concern. LM.- In the context of lack of political dialogue, what does the S.E.F. carry out in terms of activities in relation to the mainland? YWJ.- The S.E.F is quite busy regardless of the state of the dialogue. While it is the unique body in Taiwan responsible for holding negotiations with China, our day-to-day activities are devoid of political consideration. We deal with human issues. For example, we provide services, such as certification, legal attestation and so on. LM.- If a Taiwanese businessman gets married in China, you take care of the certificate? YWJ.- Exactly. And with so many Taiwanese living in China, we annually deal with more than 50,000 different cases. Actually, our different tasks are very similar to the daily work of a consulate. We do provide legal and administrative assistance. Before, when we were still unable to provide consulate related services, the local Taiwanese Businessmen Association (5) were doing those tasks. Now, we are working very closely with them. We now are in touch with 52 different branches of the Taiwanese Businessmen Association in the Mainland, which are located all over the country. LM.- Could you give me an example of how you intervene, via the branches of the Taiwanese Businessmen Association (taishangxiehui) that are based in China ? YWJ.- For example, this year one Taiwanese person died in a car accident in the province of Guangxi. We intervened jointly with the Guanxi branch of the Taiwanese Businessmen association to repatriate the body, and accomplished all the formalities. Before coming in the S.E.F. as deputy-secretary general I thought that it would just deal with high profile negotiations. In fact, we have a lot of work every day. Furthermore, each year we invite all the presidents and vice-presidents of the 52 branches of the Taiwanese Businessmen Association to come to Taiwan for an annual gathering that is attended by the President and our Premier for a roundtable discussion. LM.- How large are those Mainland organizations? YWJ.- They are quite sizeable. For example, in Dongguan, Guangzhou province, the local branch of the Association is a private legal entity with 3,700 members. One membership is 10 000 Renminbi (6) ! Notes: 1.- S.E.F. has authorization from the government and acts as a quasi-government agency. Its main functions are to provide governmental services on matters related to people-to-people exchanges between the two sides, as well as offering policy suggestions. Acting within the authority granted by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), S.E.F. contacts, consults and coordinates with the related bodies on Mainland China in term of functional and practical issues. Its counterpart in mainland China is the China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (A.R.A.T.S) whose Chairman is Wang Daohan and the Deputy-Chairman, Sun Yafu. 2.- “Chinese” in English do not reflect all the aspects of the quarrel. “Zhongguo ren” means “Chinese”, without specifying the PRC nor Taiwan. “Huaren” means that he or she is “Chinese”, and has settled down in another country endorsing the nationality of the host country. “Huaren” is usually translated as “Overseas Chinese”. “Huaqiao” means “Overseas Chinese”, but this population are still Chinese by nationality, either from PRC or Taiwan. Sometimes “Haiwai huaqiao huaren” is used to embrace all the Overseas Chinese, including Huaqiao and Huaren, but excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, if asked nationality, a Chinese from Beijing always says “zhongguo ren” that refers to “China”. In that context, Taiwanese people if responding “wo shi zhongguoren”, would mean :“I’m Chinese” and would refer to a unique “China” entity. That’s why the current DPP government do not want to cross the line, so far. 3.- In July 2001, some national policy advisors to Chen Shui-bian asked him to take a more flexible stance in dealing with the mainland in a petition which reads much like the ‘1992 consensus’: to firmly acknowledge “one China under the ROC Constitution’s framework.” The so-called 1992 consensus means recognizing that there is only “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” (yi ge zhongguo, gezi biaoshu). The petition was co-signed by other influential figures in Taiwan like Ambassador-at-Large Wu Yun-dong, Acer Group Chairman Stan Shih, human rights activist Bo Yang, and lawyer Chuang Po-lin. However, the concept behind the petition is similar to DPP Chairman Frank Hsieh’s proposal last November. Hsieh said that “one China” is the basis on which the ROC Constitution is founded. The remark was answered by a strong backlash from within the DPP at the time. 4.- On his visit to Guatemala in June, Chen Shui-bian launched the so-called “new five no’s”, namely: 1.No provocation of China. 2.No let up in attempts to improve cross-strait ties. 3.No misjudgement of the cross-strait situation. 4.Taiwan will not be a pawn in international affairs. 5.No conflict with Beijing. The Taipei mayor, Ma Ying-Jeo, strongly reacted asking when Chen will tell what to do instead of what not to do ! 5.- “Taishang zaihua xiehui” 6.- Dongguan is situated in Guandong province. It attracts dozens of Taiwanese companies, and has even opened the first Taiwanese school in China. Yeh Hung-teng, former chairman of the Taiwan Businessmen Association in Dongguan began planning the Dongguan school in 1995 in light of the high demand from Taiwanese businessmen. After years of negotiations, the Guangdong Provincial Government officially approved the Dongguan Taiwan Businessmen’s Children school’s establishment in October 1999, agreeing that the school could appoint a Taiwanese principal, hire Taiwanese teachers and adopt textbooks from Taiwan. Andrew Yeh, the chairman of YFC-Boneagle Electric Co Ltd, is the standing Vice president of the Taiwan Businessmen’s Association of Dongguan. He opened his first factory manufacturing cable and wire in Dongguan in 1990. He invested less than NT$10 million, and now the investment has grown to NT$100 million. In 1994, he began to shift all of the original production to China and kept R&D in Taiwan. Currently, the Taiwanese Businessmen’s Association of Dongguan has about 2,800 company members. In the initial period, a large percentage of investment centered on labor-intensive manufacturing industries, which mostly exported outside China. Now a lot more of it is in high-tech industries. After Dongguan, Taiwanese businessmen in Shanghai and Suzhou reportedly also have plans to set up schools there for Taiwanese children. There are an estimated 45,000 Taiwan businesses in China with over 200,000 Taiwanese employees. Shanghai is the city with the largest concentration of Taiwanese businesses. | |||
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