ASIAN AFFAIRS ON TAIWAN Paul Yip - Chairman - Hong Kong Policy Research Institute Special advisor to the Chief Executive (HKSAR) HONG KONG IS ONE SYSTEM, TAIWAN WOULD BE ANOTHER ONE. Laurent Malvezin (LM).- Meeting with the Taiwanese political establishment from the governing party and the opposition camp, what struck us was that few of them expressed a sense of urgency in opening a dialogue with China. Their misconception or even lack of knowledge about China and its current government is also quite astonishing. As Special Advisor to the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong S.A.R. for Taiwan affairs, how do you explain this situation? Paul Yip (PY).- For me the core issue that needs to be understood is the “one China principle”. Under this principle, Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan share different systems. I do not mean two systems, but several different ones. What is important to bear in mind is that the mainland China-Taiwan relationship is not and won’t be the same as the Mainland China-Hong Kong relationship. LM.- What would be the main differences that the Taiwanese fail to understand? PY.- The first one is that Hong Kong is an ex-colony with what it entails. Secondly, Hong Kong, has an obvious strong link with the central government in Beijing. From an historical point of view, Taiwan deserves to get better conditions than Hong Kong got for, as Vice-Premier Qian Qichen said: the Mainland and Taiwan are both Chinese and both China (1)! LM.- The Taiwanese are afraid to lose their own identity and to be unable to "walk down the stairs after reaching the peak" if something goes wrong later on. PY.- We know that some people in Taiwan and elsewhere are trying to undermine this vision of "one-China" by warning that Beijing would treat Taiwan as a colony. That is ridiculous. Most of the people, whether in Hong Kong or in South-East Asia understand perfectly the meaning of "one-China" many systems. 99% agree that it is the case and they appreciate it. We all have a different idea of China. LM.- The political elite of Taiwan is quite young. Is it a generation problem? PY.- Yes. The perception is a product of history. For example, for people of my generation, one China meant for long the Republic of China. There are people in Hong Kong that respect the Nationalist flag as their own emblem. They identify themselves with it. This is totally different from a Mainland point of view, because in Mainland China, it rather symbolises the “opposite side”, namely Taiwan. At school in Hong Kong, our Chinese textbooks were issued by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of China. From 1945 to 1949, while we were studying and living here, there was only one China! Of course, Hong Kong was not administered by the administration of the Republic of China, so our vision of what it was was different from its reality (2). It was just a perception of one country seen from another system. Because of this different background and angle of appreciation, even if we are for the “one China principle”, it does not mean that we agree with everything China says about Taiwan. Another important point is that Hong Kong and Taiwan do not have any feeling of belonging to the other side, and there is no rivalry between us. LM.- But is there trust? When in Taiwan, we noticed that the concept of mutual trust, “huxin” in Chinese Mandarin, is probably the key to restore a dialogue, but is lacking. What could be done to create an atmosphere of trust ? PY.- We have first to better understand each other, This is also valid for Beijing that, in my view, should tone down using its central government stature and authoritarian attitude in its dealing with Taiwan. It is not necessary. Hong Kong does not fall into this trap. We consider Taiwan as our equal partner. In that respect, the Mainland has to be more tolerant with Taiwan and its own history, especially towards indigenous Taiwanese. But the Taiwanese are not blameless. They need to eliminate all the cliché about the communist party in the Mainland. I would like to stress here that this is not only a matter of cross strait relations, but a better harmony would have tremendous benefits for the entire Asia Pacific region. When one looks at the China-Taiwan relationship, one has to see the big picture in it. LM.- For that reason, many Taiwanese think that it would be best if the issue was part of an international agenda. Don't you think it would be in fact counterproductive? PY.- That would be terrible. Taiwan must be very careful not to see the opposite side of the Asia-Pacific embodied by the United States, and expect it to engage itself into a war across the strait. That would be stupid if only because the involvement of the US would be far from certain. If you were asking me to bet on it, I would say it won’t happen. LM.- Why? The US administration has remained very ambiguous, yet it made clear that it would assist Taiwan if force was used. PY.- I would not pay too much attention to such statements because, if the United States were prepared to fight and save Europe, and they did it twice, I don't see it happening for Taiwan because of the values and beliefs at stake. The United States' values are not identical to those preached and spread among the Taiwanese population. A Christian must save another Christian, that’s for sure, but would a Christian be ready to save Taiwan, a highly traditional Buddhist and Taoist coloured culture? It is doubtful. Moreover, if the US Congressmen had been in Taiwan to watch the presidential election and had witnessed the scene of traditional voters’ totems running everywhere in the street, they certainly wouldn’t commit themselves in any kind of war for that culture. In that sense, I believe that such a scenario does not make sense. Taiwan also believes that it could buy its security with more purchases of armaments from the US and so on and so forth. Their politicians also have to clear that out of their mind. LM.- Many people were betting that Hong Kong, if the transfer of sovereignty was successful would provide the necessary precedent to reassure the Taiwanese. But it is simply not happening. Although the transfer was a success, or probably because it worked, Taiwan is rather looking down on Hong Kong as a symbolic precedent. PY.- I disagree. The Hong Kong and Taiwan trade amounts for 34 billions USD, if you compare it with Macao and Taiwan which is only 400 million USD, it is huge. 95 % of Taiwanese businessmen pass through Hong Kong to operate their business (3). LM.- Yes but isn’t it mostly because of the abnormal economic situation between the Mainland and Taiwan rather than any consideration for one another? PY.- It is not just because of the restrictions in place. It is also because Hong Kong as financial hub in Asia is not easily replaceable. But you have a point. Some people in Taiwan do not even take a look at Hong Kong because they don’t really understand the “one country two systems” formula. They think that they will be placed under Beijing’s administrative control, as Hong Kong is. In Chinese, what they say sounds like : “Hong Kong is your son, but we are not your son, we are the master of the house, the patriarch. The KMT has 90 years history, and the PCC only 80 years, so we are the elder of the family !" (4). It also explains why they are now full of praise for Shanghai saying, that’s a Chinese miracle. The success of Shanghai can be put on the sole merit of the Chinese. But when you talk about Hong Kong’s great achievements, you praise what the British did, not the Chinese! For me, I don’t mind saying that the British set up a successful system that worked and still works quite well. The most important for us, in Hong Kong, is that our heritage is recognized all across Asia and all over the world. I just hope that we could sustain that system and improve it in the future. LM.- Is the Hong Kong government in a position to help the dialogue between China and Taiwan? PY.- I know that it is said that we have some ambition in that respect. I would like to say to them that Hong Kong never had and would never have any specific political ambition or role in the cross-strait dialogue. We are just trying to get the best out of the “one country two system” for ourselves, that's all. Of course, in that process, it is possible that Hong Kong could enlighten the people of Taiwan and be the catalyst for some sort of new thinking on the issue. LM.- You mentioned that 95 % of the Taiwanese business people pass through Hong Kong to go to the Mainland. This won’t last. Once both sides enter into the WTO and when the “big three links” are established one day, what would be the consequences for Hong Kong? PY.- The question is not who is the best, Hong Kong or Taiwan, or will Hong Kong disappear after direct linkages between the two sides? That is just an academic question without relevance to the reality. LM.- What then is the reality? PY.- The reality is that Hong Kong is a tool used by many people because it is working. Look at Singapore, they are Chinese as well for the majority of them, they do speak Chinese Mandarin like in the Mainland. So why do they bother to invest and to come in Hong Kong ? Because, Hong Kong is a good intermediary tool for their business in the Mainland. There is no argument there. For the past three years, more and more foreign businesses have set up offices in Hong Kong, so the place remains attractive and is not dependent on Taiwan. LM.- Nevertheless, there is a political factor in the relationship that can't be denied. Yet, Taiwan and Hong Kong feign to ignore it. I read recently the official documents of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of Taiwan. There is no reference to Hong Kong, and no reference to the concept of "one country-many systems" while the "one China" principle is debated at length. Why is it so? PY.- As I mentioned earlier, there is a misconception about the whole concept. But it does not mean it is ignored. Recent opinion polls among the Taiwanese population show that 30 % of the population consider the “one country two systems” feasible and the way to solve the cross strait dispute. 30 per cent is a substantial number and it is a growing trend in spite of a lack of debate about it (5). The current government in Taiwan is using all sorts of pretexts not to debate it. It points out that it doesn’t want to be treated like Hong Kong was, as a colonised entity if it adheres to the formula and so on. That is just rhetoric because it knows it is not the point. The truth is that it will embrace the concept one day, but it will take some time. As you know, President Jiang Zemin declared in May during the Fortune Forum in Hong Kong, that no matter what the one “country two systems” must be carried along (6) and it will be the case. LM.- In the short term, Taiwan considers that the cross strait issue in itself is not a priority and that both sides are quite content to keep it stable as it is. But there is a worry. Because of the difficulties the Chen’s government faces and fresh elections at the end of the year, a political crisis could erupt if no majority is found while, if the DPP can find its footing in the Legislative chamber, it might become more anti-China than it is today. That would probably destabilize the status-quo. What is your scenario? PY.- I understand what you allude to but worry is not the appropriate word for I cannot be worried about such a turn of events. Why? First, no one in China, no government or official in China. Jiang Zemin included, could bear the price of the independence of Taiwan. I do hope that nobody would underestimate or misjudge the determination of the Mainland’s authorities in handling the cross-strait question. LM.- But history is full of misjudgement and as a result of lost or won wars PY.- We all know that if war blows up across the strait, that would be catastrophic for the region and the world at large. But if a choice has to be made between seeing Taiwan doing away with its independence and war, I dare say that in comparison, the latter is insignificant and meaningless from a Chinese point of view. LM.- Have you discussed that point with your many friends in Taiwan? PY.- Yes. I talked at many occasions about that with Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC) advisor, Mr Koo Chen-fu (7). He was asking me: "Vietnam got its independence, Korea as well. Why not us ? ” "But, they have won their independence at what cost, I responded ! And the context is totally different." So you can see that there is here a bottom line that it is better not to cross. No matter the score of the DPP for the coming legislative elections, no matter if it gets the majority of the Legislature or not. Only one thing matters, and that is not to cross the line. Taiwanese people, including Chen Shui-bian, are smart people. They understand the situation and they realize that saying one thing and doing another is not going to work. LM.- That is not very reassuring! PY.- The Chinese government as well as the Overseas Chinese do hope that the Taiwan’s strait dispute will be solved in the most flexible and peaceful way. After all, everything is open for discussion, provided it is under the “one China” principle. People can discuss about the anthem, the national flag, the constitution, even the concept of the Chinese Republic!. That’s true, some people put forward that the Mainland could call itself “Republic Of China”, provided that the “one China” principle is endorsed. LM.- But this is exactly this precondition that the Taiwanese government considers unreasonable! PY.- No matter what they say, I would like to stress here that there is something in common in every Chinese person in the world: they feel, they know, they understand that independence cannot in any way be won by Taiwan. It is a kind of cultural pre condition reflex. They feel it, they breath it. Even the most anti-China and anti-CCP people in the Hong Kong SAR, Szeto Hwa and Martin Lee, are for the “one China” principle. So there is no reason to worry about the political situation in Taiwan. Beijing actually does not consider the coming election as crucial for them. It is just watching what would come out of it afterwards in terms of policies, especially regarding the cross-strait issue. LM.- Can the United States factor be so easily discounted in the equation? After all, the American government says one thing, it recognises the "one-China principle" and is doing another: it is selling all kind of sophisticated weaponry and is giving moral support to the Taiwanese government to resist China's pressure. Taiwan may not cross the line on its own, but could with the covert moral support of the United States, don't you think? PY.- If I’m not worried about the coming elections results, the Taiwan-US relationship is quite worrisome in itself. Not for the reason you mention, but for the reverse. I worry that Taiwan authorities would misjudge the US attitude, cross the line and wait for the US to save them. Believe me, the Chinese all over the world would support the Chinese government in every possible action to bring back Taiwan by force. To avoid that, Beijing is on the one hand showing its goodwill to solve peacefully the dispute. It would be misleading and catastrophic trying to use the US to cross the line. LM.- As you say, there are smart persons handling the situation in Taiwan. Nevertheless, smart people do dumb things more often than not. There is also an obvious lack of expertise or a lack of objectivity – or too much emotionality - in Taiwan. They distort the perception for a clear-sighted decision making process, both on domestic and international issues. PY.- Yes, that is true. The governing party is largely made of lawyers, with rather ideologically oriented backgrounds. There is a dearth of economists and industrials within their ranks. This is the weak point of the DPP, but I do think that, as time goes by, it will become more pragmatic. After all, the government has 23 million people to feed. LM.- What do you think about the tactical pact between the DPP and the Lee teng-hui faction for the coming election? PY.- That is a very dangerous move. Dangerous not because they will be able to win the majority, as I said, it is not really the concern here. But their likely use of the so-called “localisation” (8) as their electoral platform is going to endanger the harmony and cohesion of the Taiwanese society. “Localisation” means basically “Taiwanisation”. It is going to exacerbate the divergence between different segments of the society and more specifically between the local-born Taiwanese and the “provincials” (“waisheng ren”) who came to Taiwan in 1949 (9). The antagonism could bring chaos and violence as it did in the past. One has to keep in mind that the Chinese authorities have made very clear in the past that three things could bring the use of force against Taiwan : first, an interference of foreign forces, secondly, a declaration of independence, thirdly: if the Taiwanese local authorities cannot maintain stability, in other words, if riots threaten the public order and if the local authorities cannot restore the law. LM.- From my understanding, the so-called “localisation” issue is a way to have a referendum in disguise on the question of whether the Taiwanese people are for or against China. It has little to do with a real thinking for an internal debate, and the voting behaviour would not necessarily follow this distinction between indigenous and “waisheng”. PY.- The danger is even bigger: it means that the so-called alliance between Chen and Lee is already in itself unable to put forward a sensible and comprehensive cross-strait policy, nor is it able to put forward a domestic policy to revive the economy. They only found as a common ground something that could excite or push people towards unreasonable choices without looking at the real issues. LM.- What is your opinion of the former President Lee Teng-hui who is trying to destroy the Kuomintang, his former party, by all means? PY.- Every time Lee Teng-hui has appeared on the political scene recently, this was aimed at trying to win back something that he feels would get out of his reach or expectation. He did it once during the mayoral elections of Taipei in 1998, saying that Ma Ying-jiu is Chinese … and Taiwanese! But he cannot always interfere using the same tricks. This is dangerous for Taiwan. LM.- You talk about Taipei : what is on going between Hong Kong and Taipei after the visit of Taipei’s Mayor Ma Ying-jiu (10) ? Any project for a new visit in the SAR or in Taiwan ? PY.- From now we are preparing to organise in Hong Kong, probably next year after the election of our Chief Executive, a three cities Forum between Hong Kong, Taipei and Shanghai. Spring 2001 Notes: 1.- On July 11, 2001, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen issued a plan on the model of “one country two systems” formula during a meeting in Beijing with a delegation from Taiwan’s pro-reunification New Party. Mr Qian said Taiwan could: 1) continue using its own currency, 2) maintain its status as a separate Customs territory, 3) preserve its governmental structure, 4) and armed forces, 4) public monies from Taiwan would remain on the island, 5) Beijing would guarantee private property rights, 6) Beijing grants Taiwan full autonomy for all of its political appointments. 2.- Before the civil war broke out in 1946, the KMT government had already abandoned all efforts to enhancing its influences in the peripheral areas by withdrawing troops from Vietnam, giving up the privilege of stationing troops in Japan, and accepting the return of British colonial governance in Hong Kong. Regarding the importance of textbooks in collective historical knowledge. To know more, read about The Sino-Japanese war – 1937-1945. 3.- See the interview with Ms Tsai Ing-wen on Asian Affairs website. 4.- In 1905, the Hsing Chung Hui merged with several revolutionary groups such as the Hua Hsing Hui and the Kuang Fu Hui into the Tung Meng Hui in Tokyo. The Tung Meng Hui (Tongmenghui) then merged with several other political parties to form the Kuomintang in Beijing in August 1912. In July 1914, the Kuomintang was reorganized into the Chung Hua Ke Ming Tang (the Chinese Revolutionary Party) in Tokyo and in 1919, this group was renamed the Chung Kuo Kuo Min Tang, usually shortened to Kuomintang. 5.- A recent opinion poll in Taiwan found that an increasing portion of the Taiwanese population supporting the formula. This poll was commissioned by the United Daily News. It found that 33 per cent of the 1,035 respondents were willing to accept ‘one country, two systems’, up from 23 per cent in a similar poll last December. About 50 per cent of respondents said they still could not accept the formula. This was less than in the December poll, in which 59 per cent opposed the proposal. The numbers mark a major change in public opinion. Ever since polling began on the subject in the 1980s, support for ‘one country, two systems’ had hovered around 10 per cent. The results are expected to create a public relations headache for Taipei, which has often cited public opinion as its main reason for rejecting the formula. 6.- The President Jiang Zemin’s night speech, May 8th, during the 2001 Fortune global Forum in Hong Kong, carried a strong support for the “one country two systems” experience in the SAR. The Hong Kong Government spent $9.7 million on the forum, including $4.7 million on sponsorship which went to Fortune Multimedia. 7.- Koo Chen-Fu is the Chairman of the Strait Exchange Foundation (S.E.F) and close advisor to the President. On December 1991, the Beijing government set up its Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), with Wang Daohan as its chairman. In April 1993, SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, and the ARATS chairman met in Singapore and held the first discussions between Taipei and Beijing since 1949. Provisions were made for regular and non-periodic meetings between SEF and ARATS officials. The talks resumed in October 1998 with Chairman Koo Chen-fu leading a delegation to visit the Chinese mainland. 8.- “bentuhua” in Chinese 9. – The ethnic composition in Taiwan (“zuqun jiegou”), 10.- See the interview on the website. Spring 2001 | |||