ASIAN AFFAIRS ON TAIWAN

Mo Shixiang - Director - Social Science Institute - Shenzhen University (China)

WHAT POLICY FOR TAIWAN SINCE CHEN-SUI-BIAN CAME TO POWER?

At the end of March 1997, the delegation of the Guandong Province Society for the Studies of Taiwan, of which I was a member, visited the Island. Officials and staff from both the KMT and the DPP predicted casually to us then that both parties would very likely form a kind of joint government in the future. Talking about the forthcoming elections of the county and municipal magistrates in the next half 1997, Jiao Renhe, the secretary of the Straist Exchange Foundation (S.E))., told us frankly that it was only in two or three counties or cities that KMT would be sure to win the election. Jiao also sighed that “the elections are very cruel, when the result of the votes come out, we shall all leave office.”

Three years have passed since our visit, we saw that there is a drastic change in the Taiwan political situation now, much more unexpected than the predictions we were told three years ago. Chen Sui-bian, the candidate of the DPP, surprisingly won the Taiwan general election, while KMT, the party that had dominated Taiwan for more than fifty years, lost and was driven into a party not in power.

The coming to power of Chen and the DPP with a “Taiwan Independence” party program forces the mainland, which has continuously advocated the reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, to face the most novel and unlikely political rival. The relationship between both sides therefore becomes more unpredictable.

The question arising is whether there is any need to change the established policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem.

If we trace the development of the policies of the successive leaders of the Taiwan administration from Chiang-Kai-shek, to Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, from “Recovering the Mainland” and “Reunifying China by the Three Principles of the People” to the maintaining of the existing situation of the Taiwan Straits in order to put into practice the implicit “Taiwan Independence”(or “Independent Taiwan”), it seems obvious to give a positive answer to the above question. Now that the Taiwan leaders are “one crab worse than another” which deviates more and more away from the right road of reunification, is there any need to keep the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem?

But the above answer or consideration is rather partial, for it has neither completely grasped the historic truth of the development of the relationship of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, nor accurately evaluated the evolution of Taiwan political situations and its impact on the relationship of the two sides.

Firstly, the Taiwan problem is virtually the continuation of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and KMT half century ago, the content of which included not only the struggles between the national reunification and dissentions, but foremost the choice of what party representing the interests of what class to lead the unifying class struggles, and by what idea to direct the unifying ideological struggles.

During the period of the ruling of Taiwan by Chiang, the focus of the struggles between the two sides was obviously not the former, but the latter. That is to say, by whom to dominate the unifying class and ideological struggles was the key problem of the two sides. It not only qualified the relationship of the two sides in terms of potential military conflicts and political confrontations, but it had a profound impact on the politics, economy, culture and even the social norms of the mainland and Taiwan respectively. Anyone who lived in that time will recall the history afresh. In the grim year of the struggles between the Chinese Communists and KMT to fight for the unique power of the leadership, the successful lesson summed up by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the first generation leaders of the New China, was that the political and diplomatic struggles are primary while military attacks are secondary.

In the 1970s, the normalization of the relationship and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the US, the restoration of the complete legitimate right of the PRC in the UN and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan made the Taiwan administration suddenly feel isolated in international affairs. The rapid strengthening of the politics, economy and military forces of the mainland left Chiang's clique with no alternative but to abandon the hope of seizing power nf the whole of China, and thus they turned all their attention to maintaining th Island's internal affairs, waiting for opportunities of changes. Thereafter, the mainland firmly grasped the leadership of the nation. The classes and ideological struggles of the two sides around the key problem of leadership were gradually alleviated.

In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, the second generation leader of China, on the basis of the changed internal and external situations, put forward the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems to deal with the problems left over by history of the reunification of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao with the mainland. The principle not only laid a foundation for breaking through the isolated state of the two sides and for realizing the friendly intercourse, but also pointed out the basic direction of how to realize the reunification and the respective orientations after reunification of the two sides.

In the later 1980s and early 1990s, along with the drastic political changes taking place in the Soviet Union and East Europe, the Taiwan administration for a time followed with interest the reunifying pattern of the West with East Germany. But the great achievements of the open-door policy of the mainland and the corresponding enhancement of its international standingd once more dispelled the illusion of the Taiwan administration interfering with the political affairs of the mainland, while the development of democratic politics in the Island made the parties in and out of power alike concentrate much more on the Island's internal affairs.

Lee’s claim of “the Republic of China in Taiwan” circumscribed the actual governing scope to the areas of the islands of Taiwan, Penhu, Jinman and Mazhu and openly abandoned the “legally constituted authority” of the Chiang' s clique to take over the “Central Plains” of China. Lee’s position not only disclosed his idea of “Independent Taiwan”, but also reflected the embarrassment and incompetence of the Taiwan KMT administration. Maintaining the existing situation of the Taiwan Straits and following the “Non-Independence” and “Non-Reunification” line was, therefore, gradually accepted as the commonsense of the party politics and the majority folks of the Island.

To reunify or to separately administrate in the “Independent Taiwan” style or even to disrupt the state in the fashion of Taiwan independence, became at last the focus of the struggles. In the middle and later 1990s, Lee Teng-hui visited US selling his “Two-States Theory” to seek support from and test the response of the international community. Jiang Zemin, the third generation leader of China, responded by his policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems”.

Some people might retort that since the coming to power of Chen means the coming to power of the “Taiwan Independence”, henceforth only force will solve the Taiwan Problem. Of course, the non-commitment of ever giving up using military force is included in the content of the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem .Should there be any emergency of the separation of Taiwan from China for whatever reason, or should Taiwan be occupied by foreign countries, or should Taiwan authority refuse indefinitely to peacefully solve the problem of the reunification of the two-sides by negotiation, the Chinese government cannot but take all possible drastic measures, including using military forces, to maintain the sovereignty and the territory integrity of China and to complete the grand reunification of China.

After all, Chen’s coming to power in the Taiwan general election by winning a slight majority was about “a Government for all People, an administration free from corruption”. Among the 39 per cent of the electorates who voted for Chen, a quite large number chose Chen because they were dissatisfied with the “black-gold politics” resulting from the KMT’s long-term corruption.

Chen’s administrative measures after winning are, on the one hand, conditioned foremost by the popular will of the people in the Island who did not endorse “Taiwan Independence” or even “implicit Taiwan Independence” as well as the opposition not in power, among them the KMT and the New People's party being the larger, and, on the other hand, are put under close surveillance by the mainland military and civil force as well.

This is why in his inaugural speech, although Chen avoided making any commitment to the “One-China Principle”, he guaranteed that during his term he would “not declare independence, not change the title of the reigning dynasty, not propose to write the Two-States theory into the Constitution, not to initiate to change the present state or to held a public vote for the choice between reunification and independence, and there would be no change to the Reunifying Nation Program and Society,” under the condition that “the Chinese Communists are not intending to use military forces”. Whether Chen will follow his own “promises”, we shall listen to his words and watch his deeds

The political declaration of a party not in power is usually different from the policies and measures of the party when in power; this is not uncommon in western party politics. US presidents, say Clinton, are likely to advocate “sanction China” in the period of elections in order to win votes, but once actually in power the overbearing would be much mitigated. It was reported that the Taiwan Independent Part (TAIP), a member of the DPP, was rather disappointed for Chen’s promises of the “four-not and one-no” in the inauguraL speech, and appointed the so-called year of monitoring “national subjugation” to this year; this reflected the lack of confidence in the “explicit independence” in the “implicit independence”.

Since the Taiwan style “democratic politics” was brought from the US, would Chen now also follow Uncle Sam’s tradition to refrain his spearhead of the “implicit independence” after coming to power? As we say, if you wait long enough the tail of the dragon will eventually be exposed. Anyway, the coming to power of Chen and his DPP neither changed the fact that Taiwan is a part of China nor shaken the leading position of the mainland in the evolution of the relationship between the two-sides. In the light of all these, there is no need to change the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem.

To have the global situation in mind in conducting the Taiwan Problem

The mere replacement of Taiwan’s leadership is not sufficient for us to change the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem. It is the development of the domestic and the international situation and the cardinal interests of the nation and the people that we should first take into account when conducting the Taiwan Problem and introspecting and perfecting the policies for Taiwan. In the present stage, the conducting and the solution of the Taiwan Problem, having gone beyond the local sphere of the two-sides of the Taiwan Straits, are closely connected with the global interests of the nation and the time trend of the world. Not only should we take into consideration the ways and the procedures of reunification in combination with changes of Taiwan's political situation, but also guide ultimately the result of reunification to the benefit and prosperity of Taiwan, as well as to the long term order and peace of the nation and to the peace and development of East Asia and the world.

First, strictly speaking, the policy of “peaceful reunification under one nation, two systems” unequivocally shows the ways and the destination of the reunification of the two-sides. If the progress of the reunification were smoothly conducted according to the peaceful way which the mainland has been striving for, “One Nation, two systems” would eventually be realized across the Taiwan Straits, and Taiwan would obtain far more light and broad space scope that Hong Kong and Macao. But, if it was done by non-peaceful way, i.e. war to solve the Taiwan Problem, would we still practice “One Nation, two systems” in the liberated Taiwan? If we did, was there any need and by what means would we keep on the inherited capitalism in Taiwan? If not, what would be the impact on Hong Kong and Macao which have practiced the “One Nation, two systems” that was originally designed for solving the Taiwan Problem wherein it were not ultimately practiced? How to resolve and eliminate the unavoidable negative consequences? Is there any need to advance some new policies in conducting Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao affairs? We should show foresight to all such kinds of problems caused by the chain reactions. In considering whether to give up the policy of “peaceful reunification”, we should take into account the corresponding results of how to deal with “one nation, two systems”. In case of the absence of global consideration and better methods, we should keep adhering to and making great efforts for the implementation of the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem

Secondly, it must be in the context of taking the economic construction as the central task and “viewing the whole nation as if it is a game of chess” that we must conduct and solve the Taiwan Problem. Taiwan is a part of China; for the relationship of the two-sides of the Taiwan Straits, the reunification is our aim; for the cardinal interests of the nation and the people, the reunification is the means to achieve the prosperity of the nation and the rejuvenation of the Chinese people. The ways and progress of the reunification of the two-sides should be subordinated to this overall goal.

Presently, a variety of economic and social reforms are now taking place; the reform of the state-owned enterprises and "Go-West" policy have now become the hotpot of the economic construction; the tide of the reforms leads the nation onto platforms of great leaps and at the same time to face higher social tensions. To conduct the relationship of the two-sides under this situation, we “should first of all get our own affairs well done”, as Deng Xiaoping told us. A powerful, prosperous and democratic mainland,would provide firm foundation for the eventual reunification of the two-sides.

Lastly, the conduct of the Taiwan reunification should be seen against the overall international background, in which peace and development are the main topics while all nations are striving for the establishment of a new order based on the multi-polarization of the world.

There is no doubt that the Taiwan Problem is the internal affair of China and we should oppose any kinds of foreign interference. However, some countries which have close ties with East Asian affairs, especially the US and Japan, always tend to interfere with the conflicts across the Taiwan Straits for a variety of reasons and by various means, obstructing or impeding the progress of the reunification of the two-sides. For instance, the US publicly declares that it sticks to the “One-China” policy, on the one hand; and continuously adheres to the “fuzzy policy” of the military interference with Taiwan affairs which has been carried out since the 1950s, on the other hand. The essence of the policy is to obstruct the confrontations or reunifying or dissecting manoeuvers across the Taiwan Straits in order to maintain the long-term non-reunifying and non-independent situation through military interference or non-interference of different degrees.

The vital part of which is to preserve the fuzziness of the degrees of military interference; it make believes neither on the Taiwan side that the US will definitely dispatch troops to give it a free hand to “recover the mainland” or set its mind at rest to declare “Taiwan Independence”; nor on the mainland side that the US will definitely not dispatch troops to help Taiwan to resist the ready liberation of Taiwan.

The policies, therefore, guarantee the deterrent forces of the US to prohibit any significant manoeuvers that might be taken by both sides of the Straits in order to acquire the strategic interests of the US in East Asia. In fact, in recent years, the Clinton administration, while repeatedly making known to Taiwan the position of not supporting “Taiwan Independence”, emphasizing to the mainland that it should be through dialogues to solve the conflicts between the two-sides, ended up virtually strengthening by various ways the regulating and arbitrating forces of the “fuzzy policies” for intervening in Taiwan affairs.

We should get a clear understanding of the essence and the strategy of the “fuzzy policies” of the US towards Taiwan affairs. When considering the non-peaceful ways to solve the Taiwan Problem, we should prepare to frustrate the highest degree military intervention of the US. If forced to choose war to realize the reunification of the two-sides, we should try hard to be in the best position to rapidly end it, and at the same time prepare to cope with the worst situation that it might not and could spread.

The peaceful coexistence between the US and China is in accordance with the cardinal interests of the people of the two nations and even all people in the world. In appropriately dealing with the severe event of bombarding the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia by US air forces, Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders defended not only the state sovereignty but the global situation of the world peace ethic.

In brief, provided we have the whole situation in mind can we sincerely believe that continuously adhering to the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” is the best choice for conducting and solving the Taiwan Problem. Any event at the present stage where Taiwan should declare independence or change “the title of reigning dynasty” would force the mainland to make a different choice. If that happens, the Chinese government and people would be forced to solve the Taiwan Problem by war to defend the territory and sovereignty of the motherland, lost or win will all be ignored. It should be clear to Chen and other Taiwan new leaders that Taiwan independence means war, the matters are of serious concern to the safety or danger of the Island and the happiness of the Taiwan people, this is the case that they should bear in mind rudimentarily.

To seek for no-longer-dilatory tactics in the process of the existing procrastination.

The Taiwan Problem, which was left in the history of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and KMT since later 1940s, has lasted unsolved for half a century, it is unpredictable even today when and how it will eventually be solved. The Chinese government and the mainland people are always expecting the earlier reunification of the two-sides and have made unremitting efforts for it. To prohibit the Taiwan administration from indefinitely delaying the peaceful reunification process of the two-sides, the Chinese government, in the “white-paper book” published in February this year, placed as the last resort for solving the Taiwan Problem by non-peaceful ways the condition “if Taiwan authority should refuse indefinitely to peacefully solve the problem of the reunification of the two-sides by negotiation”. This showed that the mainland is no longer allowing the Taiwan authority to delay indefinitely. However, it is predictable that for quite a long time the Taiwan administration would still use dilatory tactics and try hard to maintain the present “Non-Independence” and “Non-Reunification” situation. Obviously, we should seek and implement the corresponding methods to prevent dilatory tactics in the process of the existing procrastination.

Firstly, we should try, with the attitude of “know the enemy and know yourself” and place the priority emphasis on winning over the popular will of the Taiwan people, to understand and study the democratic politics and the operations of the parties including DPP in the Island. It is not enough only to use the “criticizing weapons” and “weapons for criticizing”, but, in accordance with the “rules of the game, to understand the Taiwan people, to enhance the identification of the political parties and people of Taiwan with the mainland and gradually to influence and eventually to lead the popular will of the majority Taiwan people into the endorsement of the reunification. We must be clear that to criticize from the other side of the Straits the emotion is vivid though the effect is faint also. It is only by working in the Island and appealing to the hearts of the Taiwan people that could the popular will be persuaded that reunification would genuinely have the effect of “initiating officials by the folks”. Even if there is no other way but to appeal to the non-peaceful ways to reunify Taiwan, it is also necessary to win the understandings of and supports from the Taiwan people.

To win over the popular will of Taiwan people, we should, by broadening interchanges, renewing dialogues and consulting with all parties in or not in power, reinforce the strength of the implementation of the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem. Up to now, the exchange of visits of the two-sides has had appeared to be non-balanced, i.e. it is convenient for compatriots in Taiwan, with large numbers of visitors, to go to the mainland, while the applications to enter the Island for the mainlanders is very difficult; the numbers s are small and out of proportion. This phenomenon is not in fact beneficial to the carrying out of the work of peaceful reunification in the Island. The departments concerned on the mainland should eagerly have an overall planing to solve the problem, firstly eliminating some artificially imposed obstacles which make things difficult for ourselves and then negotiating with the counterparts of Taiwan the matters of increasing the number of mainlanders to visit Taiwan. I suggest that in some appropriate time to reopen the dialogues and negotiations between the two-sides, and at the same time to discuss the national affairs with persons of insight from various parties in Taiwan via various ways in order to advance the reunification process and to make clear and perfect the blueprint of the implementation of the “one nation, two systems” in Taiwan.

Some persons in Taiwan do not approval of “one nation, two systems” because they think that the policy would not bring about new actual benefits for the Island but conversely would cause Taiwan to lose some original things, for instance, the “title of reigning dynasty”. It is obviously imperative for the mainland departments conducting Taiwan affairs to reflect and solve the following problem: how to work out a concrete scheme of “one nation, two systems” which would be accepted by the majority of Taiwan people, combining with effective propaganda to lead public opinion of Taiwan in order to form the tide of the popular will in favor of reunification. It is obviously more constructive for dealing with this kind problem on time than the mere passive reaction of the “big criticism”.

As has been mentioned above, the mainland has always been on the initiative in conducting and solving the Taiwan Problem. However, without need for reticence, there occasionally appeared in recent years that the mainland strongly responded to provocative speeches made by Taiwan leaders, to the point that some people made fun of the contest of the two-sides as a fight between an elephant and a rat. Why not, in the concrete contests, make some changes to the old routines in which Taiwan provokes and the mainland responds and replace the passive reactions by active actions? I hope that the question raised might urge some departments concerned to reflect and to improve the tactics in the contest with Taiwan, to raise the level and the art of winning over the popular will of people.

The non-commitment of not employing forces in the process of the implementation of the policy of “peaceful reunification and one nation, two systems” for conducting the Taiwan Problem is a measure to cope if necessary with Taiwan independence, the foreign invasions and the indefinite procrastination of negotiations. The three “ifs” in the declaration of the Chinese government are the principles and conditions for employing forces, which should be stressed in the propaganda to Taiwan. Besides these, we should not take as the sign for using forces any particular person or event that are not coincident with the content of the three “ifs”, or else, it would be none other than giving up the flexibility and destroying the principle of the employment of forces.

The equality of the coming to power of Chen or that of Taiwan-independentists with the reason for employing forces shall only have the effect of the empty words “the wolves have come” and, after the shouts, it would be very likely to give a handle that “the mainland does not dare to attack Taiwan” to those who have an axe to grind. With this perspective, it is of equal importance to insist the principle and the flexibility in the problem of employing forces as the last resort toward Taiwan. To insist the flexibility, there is no need to disclose too early the concrete targets, time, places and scope that the forces might be used, therefore to maintain the most flexible deterrence and maneuvering powers. In this respect, it is profitable to learn from the “fuzzy policies” of the US in its intervention in Taiwan affairs. At least we could avoid criticism by overseas, time and again, that the mainland experts dealing with the Taiwan Problem are “speaking with too little room”.

No doubt, it is the most difficult problem in reality that might greatly test the wisdom of the statesmen of the two-sides and that of the Chinese people at home and abroad alike how to give free rein to their subjective initiatives to seek the ways that would no longer be delayed to solve the problem in the process of the existing procrastination of the Taiwan Problem. Anyway, now that the compatriots across the Taiwan Straits have made their respectively brilliant achievements that attracted the worldwide attention, could it be said that it is impossible for them to be able to peacefully deal with the relationship in the grand “One-China” family?

Winter 2000

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