notes Musharraf


	1. - The Indian version of this episode is quite different. Prakash Pillai, a noted editorialist of the Hindustan Times wrote that the operation was not a response to some incursions but “meticulously planned by the top Pakistani army establishment in a bid to capture the deserted heights in Indian territory, left by Indian army during the inhospitable weather conditions and then taking control of the vital Srinagar-Leh highway. The Pak army thought that by capturing the strategic heights they will be in a position of strength and get the status of the Line of Control (LoC.) altered.” “According to a top (Indian) army source, Prakash Pillai said, the Kargil operation was planned months in advance and kept a top secret that was confined to a very few top army officers. The Pak Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of General Staff (CGS), Director General Military Operations (DGMO), GOC 10 Corps and GOC Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) who were made overall anchorage of operations in the Karl sector were the only ones aware about the actual operation. Even the Corps Commanders were not kept in picture.” Pillai’s remark suggests that, according to the Indians, the civilian Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharrif (that General Pakistan would depose later on), had been kept in the dark and was not aware of the planning of the operation. But then what was the motive? General Musharraf today is unwilling to go over the issue again probably because the Kargil war ended up in a failure, without any political or military gain. Many believe even today that the Pak army thought that the operation would help in internationalizing the Kashmir issue. By putting the Kashmiri issue on the international scene (in those days the war on terrorism did not exist yet), Pakistan was expecting the United Nations to be implicated in a war of liberation. There was some logic in those days for such an analysis because the event was taking place on the tail of the break-up of Yugoslavia into smaller independent countries under the argument that it was a democratic right for Slovenia, Bosnia, Herzegovina people to chose their country. And such approach had the support of the international community until it became a war of religion. On the military angle, Pakistan army's objective was, according to the Indian analysts, to exploit large gaps, which existed in the defenses in the sector both on Indian and Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC). They thought, the Indians said, that Zoji La Pass, the only route connecting these regions normally could only open because of the weather in July, thus making the movement of reinforcements by surface from Srinagar impossible until then even if the incursions were to be detected. The bet was, that even if the intrusions were discovered in early May, the reaction of Indian Army would be slow and limited, thereby allowing it to consolidate the intrusions more effectively. The intrusions, if effective, indeed, would have enabled Pakistani troops or Mujahiddeens to secure several dominating heights from where the Road Srinagar-Leh could be cut off in various locations. The plan was to give Pakistan or Kashmiri Mujahiddeens control over substantial piece of ground across LoC and enable her to negotiate from a position of strength and alter the status of LoC. What the Indians claim today is that it is not to support the Mujahiddeens that the Pakistan army moved on but the reverse. To give legitimacy to its push, the Pakistani army is supposed to have provided the logistic to infiltrate up 800 or more militants to the Skardu Area. Later on, the Indian army claimed that the Pakistan army soldiers were ordered to undertake all operations in local tribal attire so as to depict them as the so-called Mujahiddeens. However, despite these so-called instructions, the Indian government had to admit that a number of Pakistan Army soldiers captured during the war, were carrying their uniforms and identity documents with them, which is rather contradictory if the entire operation was supposed to be a covert one. In any case, India got a hand to two separate telephonic conversations between the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of General Staff, discussing the Kargil operations. The Indian government concluded that the entire operation was masterminded at the highest level and conducted by Pakistan Army Regulars and not by the Mujahiddeens. Prakash Pillai wrote that, initially, Pakistan refused to accept the dead bodies of its soldiers but under pressure from home the Pakistani army had to accept the death of some of its army officers. In the end, international pressure was brought to bear not on India, who claimed self-defense, but on Pakistan to stop incursions. The then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharrif went to the United States for assistance but was told by the US administration to first withdraw all its forces from the region. Sharrif was forced to sign the withdrawal of forces. Few months later he was overthrown by the same forces and initially jailed under the argument that he planned to assassinate General Musharraf by refusing permission to land to the plane carrying General Musharraf. The claim was never thoroughly investigated. Nawaz Sharrif lives now in exile in Saudi Arabia. 2 .- Looking at Indian proposals, Sardar F.S. Loti, a retired lieutenant-general of the Pakistan army writes the following: “India's latest peace proposals consist of 12 points for normalizing relations between the two countries. Pakistan, after some hesitation, agreed to some of the proposals and put across some points of its own. India's first item is to resume talks to restore civil aviation links, including overflight rights. This is of some significance to India, as all her westbound and northbound flights barring a few, have to skirt around Pakistan air space. This is costing her millions of dollars in extra fuel and it takes a longer time. It is also in urgent need of quick air access to Afghanistan and Iran. In any case it was India that unilaterally without giving any notice stopped overflights. This time Pakistan wants a system in place, which will prevent India from abruptly stopping civil aviation flights at its will and pleasure. This is why the previous negotiations at Rawalpindi failed. India's second item is the resumption of rail links, following the aviation talks. If the object is to help the people of both countries why hold the resumption of rail link hostage to the success to that of air links. India had stopped the trains from running across the international border between Lahore and Amritsar. India should have announced the restoration of the Samjhota Express The next item is to resume bilateral sports competitions including cricket. This is a good idea and had already been suggested by Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. The fourth item is to issue visas in cities outside the two country's national capitals to shorten travel. This will entail opening an Indian office in Karachi and a Pakistani one in Bombay. It will certainly help the people of Sindh who have now to travel to Islamabad to obtain a visa for India. It may however be recalled that the Indian deputy high commission's office was closed in Karachi as it was alleged to have become a controlling hub of anti-state activities. The fifth item is to permit individuals aged 65 and above to cross into India on foot. Previously only groups could walk across, while individuals had to be on a bus. This could be of help to some elderly individuals wishing to travel to India urgently. Why not those below 65 also? The sixth item is to run more buses on the New Delhi-Lahore route. This is a good idea as the number of people wishing to visit across the border is on the increase. The seventh item is to establish links between the coast guards of both countries. Following from this is the next item, which would prevent India and Pakistan from arresting each other's fishermen in certain sea areas. Some method could be evolved to stop illegal fishing in Pakistani waters and early repatriation of detained fishermen. Item nine provides free medical treatment to another 20 Pakistani children. It is a humanitarian gesture, which should be lauded. Item 10 is about increase of staff at each other's high commission. In fact, India had recalled its high commissioner from Islamabad and later sidelined our high commissioner in New Delhi and started dealing with his nº2, eventually requesting for his return. Increase in the number of staff would be a natural step while relations are being normalized between the two countries. Item 11 is about a ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi. This is a cheaper way of travelling and would help the people of Sindh. Ferry service was discontinued after the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Item 12 suggests starting of new bus services, one between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. The other would be a bus or rail link between Khokrapar in Sindh and Munabo in India's Rajasthan state. The reopening of the Khokrapar-Munabo link would help the people of Sindh. They would avoid travelling to Lahore to enter India. As for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, Pakistan feels this may well be India's effort to convert the line of control into an international border. In any case very few Kashmiris would wish to travel by road to Srinagar as the entire Kashmir valley is infested with Indian troops and other paramilitary forces. They have been vested with extra powers to stop, search, detain or shoot any body they suspect of being a "terrorist". They are trigger-happy and shoot to kill without any compunction or fear. Most of the Indian suggestions are not of such importance, which may help to reduce tension between the two countries or act as confidence-building measures. To ease tension India should have agreed to a ceasefire along the Line of Control to avoid civilian deaths. The ceasefire could have been effectively monitored by extra UN observers along both sides of the line of control. At present they are only on the Pakistan side. Above all, if India is serious about improving relations with Pakistan it should have withdrawn a 100,000 or more troops and other para-military forces from the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir where over 700,000 troops are acting as an army of occupation and are inflicting untold suffering on the hapless civilian population. Pakistan has given a positive response by accepting most of the measures suggested by India - like the proposals pertaining to the resumption of the Samjhota Express sporting ties, visa camps with provision of necessary infrastructure and staff, land border crossing by people in the age-group of 65 and above, and setting up of a hotline between Pakistan's Maritime Agency and Indian Coast Guard to ensure humanitarian and expeditious assistance to arrested fishermen of either country. About the Indian suggestions for Mumbai-Karachi ferry service and opening a land route between Munabo and Khokhrapar, Pakistan was of the view that these issues should better be left for consideration during the negotiations. About the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service Pakistan was of the view that the checkpoints should be manned by the United Nations and Kashmiri passengers should carry UN travel papers. An alternative would be to allow travel on identity papers issued by the governments at Muzaffarabad and Srinagar. Pakistan offered medical aid and assistance to the Kashmiris (of Indian-held territory) victims of violence and rape and to the widows from the Valley. Pakistan felt that international humanitarian bodies could be associated with the implementation of this proposal. Pakistan also offered scholarships for 100 Kashmiri students for studies in graduate and post-graduate courses in professional institutions. These fresh items will certainly help the people of Indian-occupied Kashmir. It could of course be argued that some of the suggestions put forward by India and Pakistan have political overtones verging more towards public relations at home and abroad. Some have called them tactical moves for positions of importance in the larger game. Whatever the aims be and objectives of the various suggestions, they should be accepted on their projected face value. Even a minor confidence building-measure may in the long run help in reducing some tension between the two countries. 3 .- Bhutan is a landlocked country between China and India, with an area of 47,000 sq km and a border of 600 km with India. Her population is estimated at just over 2 million. Nepal is also a landlocked country sandwiched between China and India, with 1690km of border with India, an area of 140 800 sq km and a population of 26 469 000. Sri Lanka is an island of 65 610 sq km at the south tip of the Indian continent. About 20 million people live in Sri Lanka. Bangladesh was formally Bengali East Pakistan. It seceded from the Union with West Pakistan in 1971. It is practically surrounded by India with whom it shares a 4053 km long border. It has also a short 400 km border with Burma and a short coastline of 480 km. Her total area is only 144 000 sq km on which live more than 138 million people. Pakistan is a much larger country (803 940 sq km) with a 2 912 km long border with India (and borders with Afghanistan (2430 km), China (523 km) and Iran (909 km). Her population is about 151 million. All combined, the five countries have a population of about 337 million, which amounts to just a bit more than a quarter of the size of India. 4.- Despite differing political, economic, ideological and social systems, Pakistan and China have developed enduring strategic ties since their relationship was first established in the 1950s as a counter-balance to India (who was then an ally of the Soviet Union). Besides political and diplomatic co-operation, the two countries have been extensively involved in wide-ranging defense co-operation, particularly in the controversial area of nuclear weapons and missile technology (although both Pakistan and China have constantly denied any cooperation in this matter). The post cold war period has provided the two countries with greater opportunities to strengthen their alliance than ever before. It is against this background of growing convergence of their interests that Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji became one of the first dignitaries to visit Islamabad after the coup d’état of General Musharraf. During that meeting, taking place before 9/11, sharing the Chinese vision of a multi-polar world, Pakistan's military chief executive, General Pervez Musharraf, expressed his opposition to the regional dominance of India and global influence of the USA and called instead for a greater Chinese role in international affairs. Rejecting the US National Missile Defense (NMD) programme in the presence of the Chinese leader, he made clear Islamabad's strategic support for the Chinese government - which has always been opposed to the NMD project. During the visit, Premier Zhu Rongji praised Musharraf for promoting stability and economic development, thus - albeit indirectly - endorsing his military regime which was at the time outcasted by the international community. Furthermore, Zhu also offered Beijing's support for Islamabad's position on the Kashmir issue. He then signed many economic agreements (along with $250 million worth of credit), extending assistance in developing Pakistan's nuclear power infrastructure and other core industrial sectors. Significantly, the two countries signed agreements construct jointly the deep-sea Gwadar Port on the Makran Coast in Baluchistan. In a post September 11 analysis, Dr Subbash Kapila of the South Asia Analysis Group, pointed out that the cornerstone of Pakistan’s strategic policies has been its undying military relationship with China. “The Pakistan-China strategic relationship has been the most predominant and overriding objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy”, he wrote, referring once again to nuclear and missile technology. The other significant feature of Pakistan’s foreign policy has been its inconsistent military relationship with the United States that went through extreme swings with the intermissions marked by lows in relationship between the two countries. Noticeably, Pakistan never made attempts to reverse the lows in its relationship with the United States. It was always the United States, which reclaimed and resurrected this relationship, not for any benign reasons of building up the badly needed democratic structures to Pakistan, but to use Pakistan to serve American strategic and national security interests. The post-September relationship is further proof of this permanent trait in their relationship. Pakistan was in one of its longest periodic lows in its relationship with the United States till September 11. In the decade preceding that event, the Pakistan-China relationship had reached its highest point. This strategic dalliance had been conducted in open defiance of United States sensitivities, and periodic sanctions against both. United States officials, think tanks, and academia had termed Pakistan as a 'rogue state', 'failed state’ and the cesspool of Islamic Jihadi terrorism for most of the decade, before turning its attention to the al-Qaeda network. However, Pakistan in the preceding decade, for precisely the same reason, was held in high esteem by the Washington’s establishment, as it was the nurturing ground of the Taliban, who were then fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Post 9/11, Pakistan under intense American coercion and warnings opted for what apparently appeared to be a complete strategic reversal of its previous policies towards the Taliban. Overnight, the Pakistan government abandoned its support for the discredited regime and General Musharraf authorized nearly 48,000 US troops on Pakistani soil and the use of Pakistani Air Force bases for the launching of American military operations against the Afghan government. Soon after, the Taliban regime collapsed. For a while, Pakistan apparently allowed its strategic convergences with China to be pushed into the background. From ‘rogue state”, Pakistan became a “strategic partner in global counter-terrorism War ', and its military regime accorded political legitimacy. Then in March 2004, Colin Powel, announced to the dismay of India, that the Bush administration would grant the status of “strategic non-Nato ally” (MNNA) to Pakistan Against such a backdrop, the moot question was whether Pakistan’s strategic reversal post 9/11 signaled an end or a dilution of the Pakistan-China relationship. Subsequent events show that the strategic alliance with China remains pretty much unchanged: While Pakistan, or rather General Musharraf’s regime seemed to be enjoying the American embrace once again (opinion polls have constantly indicated that the Pakistani people are opposed to the warming between the Bush administration and their government), unfolding events in 2002 gave clear indications that Pakistan’ s strategic alliance with China stood unchanged. Pakistan’s military continued his close relationship with China with the focus on joint defense research and production as well as exchange of high-level defense visits, that culminated in an official visit of General Musharraf to China in November 2004 during which a friendship treaty was signed as well as economic agreements. Furthermore, Pakistan’s invitation to China for development and construction of her strategic naval base at Gwadar on the Makran coast has wide strategic significance for two reasons. It gives China access and repair facilities in the Indian Ocean and in close proximity to the Straits of Hormuz. 5 .- I t is not correct. Economic activity had slowed in 2001 as a result of an unprecedented drought, a weakening external environment and higher oil prices; GDP grew at about 3.3 percent during the calendar year 2001 as compared to nearly four percent during calendar year 2000. Foreign demand for Pakistani products dropped significantly after it became clear there was going to be a war between the United States and the neighboring Taliban regime in Afghanistan; export orders were canceled as buyers, shippers and insurance companies became reluctant to risk normal economic activities in Pakistan. However, inflation rates have remained below five percent as energy prices have stabilized and the rupee benefited from increased demand in the aftermath of the war of terrorism. 6.- General Musharraf is crediting himself for events that were beyong his control and had little to do with economic reforms. The current account deficit, which exceeded six percent of GDP in 1995-1997 was reduced to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2000 owing to the strength of textile exports (thus exports generated under Nawaz Sharrif pro-business government), then swung into surplus in 2001 despite steeply falling exports. The reason for the swing is that imports declined drastically in the wke of 9/11 while overseas remittances surged as the war on terrorism cracked down on 'underground' systems of repatriating Pakistani workers' earnings without using the banking system. Pakistan's current account is subject to considerable volatility due to the heavy concentration of cotton-based exports and other commodities. Pakistan typically runs a deficit of US$1-2 billion in its merchandise trade account and a deficit on international services of about US$3 billion, but it has also typically received US$2-3 billion in remittances from Pakistanis working abroad, many in the oil fields of the Middle East. These repatriated earnings have made a significant contribution to the current account over the years. With more of such remittances moving through the banking system rather than through informal payment channels, Pakistan's current account balance has indeed been be further improved in 2002 and 2003. More significantly, Pakistan's capital account, which had been surplus in the US$2-4 billion range in the mid-1990s, turned sharply negative by FY 1999/2000. Infusions of foreign direct investment, which had reached nearly US$1 billion in FY 1996/1997, declined, as did concessionary aid with sanctions taken after the nuclear tests affected these critical financial flows. A crisis situation existed as foreign currency reserves held by the government fell to less than US$1 billion providing less than one month of import coverage. But, with improved relations with the IMF upon satisfactory completion of Stand-by Agreement obligations and implementation of the PRGF program and a renewed relationship with the United States, funding to support Pakistan's balance of payments turn positive. Official aid and the extraordinary remittance flows in late 2001 and early 2002 enabled the State Bank of Pakistan to rapidly accumulate an unprecedented stock of international reserves, holding more than US$3.3 billion in reserves as of the end of the first quarter of calendar year 2002 (a level more than double what it held in mid-2001) The current foreign reserves stand at $11.75 billion out of which around $3.2 billion will be placed in the global financial market through the approved fund managers. 7. - The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find co-coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor nations. Paris Club creditors agree to reschedule debts due to them. Rescheduling is a means of providing a country with debt relief through a postponement and, in the case of concessional rescheduling, a reduction in debt service obligations. The first meeting with a debtor country was in 1956 when Argentina agreed to meet its public creditors in Paris. Since then, the Paris Club or ad hoc groups of Paris Club creditors have reached 374 agreements (breakdown by year) concerning 79 debtor countries. Since 1983, the total amount of debt covered in these agreements has been $418 billion (breakdown by year). In spite of such an activity, the Paris Club has remained strictly informal. It is the voluntary gathering of creditor countries willing to treat in a co-coordinated way the debt due to them by the developing countries. It can be described as a "non institution". Although the Paris Club has neither legal basis nor status, agreements are reached following a number of rules and principles agreed by creditor countries, which help a coordinated agreement to be reached efficiently. The creditor countries meet 10 to 11 times a year, for negotiation sessions or to discuss among themselves the situation of the external debt of debtor countries or methodological issues on the debt of developing countries. These meetings are held in Paris. The Chairman is a senior official of the French Treasury. Deputies to the Chairman in the French Treasury serve as co-president and vice-president. The 19 Paris Club permanent members are governments with large claims on various other governments throughout the world (the claims may be held directly by the government or through its appropriate institutions). They have constantly applied the terms defined in the Paris Club Agreed Minutes on their claims in the past (this means principally having cancelled claims for countries benefiting from debt reduction and restructured claims over periods of comparable maturity) and have settled any bilateral disputes or arrears with Paris Club countries, if any. The following countries are permanent Paris Club members: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America. 8. - The US State Department has said that it would provide $300 million as Military Financing assistance in 2005 to strengthen Pakistan’s ability to confront terrorist remnants seeking sanctuary in its border regions. A fact sheet of the State Department said other security assistance to Pakistan would help strengthen its law enforcement and counter-narcotics capacities. It also announced Pakistan’s debt to the United States has been cut in half by $1.5 billion. The United States waived off $1 billion debt in 2003 and decided to cancel another $460 million in April 2004. The State Department maintained that debt relief would free up national revenue for programmes to improve the quality of life and increase the capacity of Pakistan’s local governments to meet the needs of their people, although little reach actually the impoverish part of the country. The Bush Administration has also notified to the Congress its intent to provide additional debt relief to Pakistan under the 2004 package of $395 million. It is part of a declared $3 billion, five-year assistance package announced by President Bush in June 2003. But the officials of Pakistan, General Musharraf included, have no qualm to attribute the merit of the assistance they receive to whomever they want to cajole on a given day. The Minister of Finance, Shaukat Aziz attributes the reduction of debts granted by the Paris Club to "the United States” while General Musharraf is telling us that the merit should be given to the European countries!" 9.- Currently the Iraqi police and militias under one or the other political figures of the country amount to no more than 200,000 ill-equiped men. 10 .- See in this issue the article on the Durand line by Tariq Muhmad Ashraf. In the article, the author, a retired Air Commodore of the Pakistan Air Force explains the historical background that let these tribal areas be a no-man’s land, politically speaking. 11 .- MMA is an umbrella opposition party composed of six religious parties and is tied to Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a popular fundamentalist religious organization. The group gained control of the North West Frontier Province, or NWFP, the northern-most Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan, and has already begun putting strict Islamic law into place there. The answer is shows an ullimited self-confidence or a dangerous delusion. After all the radical Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a Pakistani political alliance, came in third place in the 2002 National Assembly elections in that country. It certainly represent more than a fraction of the population. But General Musharraf is right to point out that never before in Pakistan’s history has a religious political party won more than five percent of the National Assembly. That is why he hopes that at the next election, the tide of fundamentalism will recede. The MMA, which openly supports the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan as well as Osama bin Laden‚ won 60 seats in the Assembly (up from two previously), behind the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) with 71 seats and the Pakistan Muslim League, Quaid-e-Azam faction (PML/Q) with 69 seats. The religious party even won a seat from the nation’s capital, Islamabad, which has a large population of Western-educated people. A total of 73 parties contested the 342 seats for a new Parliament and four provincial assemblies. During the Senate, or upper house, elections during February 2003, political scandal pervaded. The Pakistani electoral system is similar to an electoral college - voters elect a tribal leader who then votes for a candidate. Eight out of 12 of the elected NWFP tribal leaders were backing the MMA candidates, however, six of the original eight changed their vote at the last minute from MMA members to members of more moderate political parties. Earlier, six pro-MMA tribal leaders were allegedly held hostage by MMA members until the Senate election so they were not subjected to influence by other political parties. Shortly before the elections, they were released and members of the national government apprehended two. According to the Jang group, a prominent Pakistani news group, one of the tribal leaders, Maulana Abdul Malik, said he was pressured to vote for certain moderate candidates in the Senate elections. All of this came maybe as a reaction to the unilateral action taken in August 2002 by President Musharraf announcing a framework of constitutional changes. Most of the changes give the President more power, but Musharraf claims the changes were essential to bring true democracy to the region. Some of the changes include the establishment of a military-dominated National Security Council, provisions to allow the President to dismiss the National Assembly, and provisions calling for presidential appointment of armed services chiefs. Opposition groups have been calling for Musharraf’s resignation, saying that only the Parliament has the right to amend the constitution. October 2002 was the first National Assembly vote in Pakistan in five years. About two weeks prior to the election, al-Qaeda distributed pamphlets in areas bordering Afghanistan and urged people to vote for the MMA and reject secular and pro-Musharraf candidates. The MMA has publicly denounced President Musharraf and his pro-U.S. policies, and an MMA leader Qazi Hussain has repeatedly warned against recognizing Israel. Although the MMA is in strict opposition to Musharraf’s military regime, it was precisely that regime that promoted the group in order to sideline the mainstream political opposition. This method was a calculated risk to round up Western support for the Musharraf regime stemming from a fear of an Islamic fundamentalist party taking control of nuclear-capable Pakistan. However, a growing relationship between Musharraf and the U.S. as well as his severing ties with Taliban allies has increased the conflict with Islamist movements that seek to turn Pakistan into a hard-line Islamic state. The worry is that, if the election results from the 2002 National Assembly elections and the 2003 Senate elections are the beginning of a trend in Pakistani politics, the NWFP won’t be the only area with significant fundamentalist Muslim representation. Currently, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are almost impervious to infiltration by the Pakistani military or security services because of the abundance of militant clannish Muslims in control of the territory as well as the rough mountainous terrain. Intelligence officials claim there are many Taliban members being safeguarded in the region, as well as al-Qaeda operatives and militants with ties to numerous other terrorist networks. A recent military operation to flush out support for the Taliban and for Osama Bin Laden ended in a failure with close to a hundred military personnel killed and many civilian casualties. 12.- In Asian Affairs nº 17 – Siddiqa-Agha, a former Director of Naval Research, writes: ‘Pakistan has very unimpressive economic and socio-economic growth indicators. Moreover, social and human development indicators are equally poor (…) - at least 28 million people live below the poverty line; - two-thirds of the adult population are illiterate; - basic health facilities are available to only half the population; Such negative indicators are not surprising in a state where the government’s priorities reflect a bias for military security over socio-economic development. Table 1 Pakistan: Defense versus Development FY Health Education Defense % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP 1981-82 0.6% 1.4% 5.7% 1982-83 0.6% 1.5% 6.4% 1983-84 0.6% 1.6% 6.4% 1984-85 0.7% 1.8% 6.7% 1985-86 0.7% 2.3% 6.9% 1986-87 0.8% 2.4% 7.2% 1987-88 1.0% 2.4% 7.0% 1988-89 1.0% 2.1% 6.6% 1989-90 0.9% 2.2% 6.8% 1990-91 0.8% 2.1% 6.3% 1991-92 0.7% 2.2% 6.3% 1992-93 0.7% 2.4% 6.0% 1993-94 0.7% 2.2% 5.6% 1994-95 0.7% 2.4% 5.5% 1995-96 0.8% 2.4% 6.2% 1996-97 0.8% 2.5% 6.5% 1997-98 0.7% 2.3% 6.9% 1998-99 0.7% 2.2% 7.1% Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan The military has always repulsed any move to reduce the military expenditure. For example, a move to reduce defense spending during the government of Prime Minister Junejo (1985-87) was rebuffed by the military President, General Zia-ul-Haq. “How can you fight a nuclear submarine” Zia declared “or an aircraft carrier with a bamboo stick? We have to match sword with sword, tank with tank, and destroyer with destroyer. The situation demands that national defense be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defense expenditure, since you cannot freeze the threat to Pakistan’s security.” (Can Pakistan turn around? – Asian Affairs nº17). The budget of the Musharraf government still fail in 2004 fails to provide for education and health and employment opportunities. The agreed requirement for Pakistan has long been considered to be a minimal 6 % of GDP on Health sector, and 4.5 % on Education. That would actually only provide for every two young children that only one goes to school and the other is deprived of his basic right of schooling also. Those budgetary allocation figures have never been reached in the history of Pakistan while the army has always enjoyed a larger share of the GDP. Today nothing has changed. 13.- Looking at the Pakistani budget of the education between 2000 and 2004, we have been unable to find figures that would back up the claim of President Musharraf. At best, we have seen an incremental increase of no more than 10% a year on some allocations, mainly in infrastructure. Deflated by the inflation factor and the population growth, the increase seems to be marginal and not enough to change the fact that more than 70 million people have no access to proper health care and the school system will cater for less than a child out of two. 14.- As far as the growth of religious schools was concerned, Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha writes, they belong to two categories divided as follows: (a) Areas where their establishment was encouraged by the state - schools belonging to this category were found in the northern areas; and (b) Regions where these schools grew primarily due to socio-economic underdevelopment. The schools falling in this category were more proactive in their negative contribution to militancy. The southern part of Punjab saw these madrisahs and militancy spread with a greater speed for these reasons but the former madrisahs were used to train the Taliban. Most of the Taliban were educated in these centers. This is not to suggest that madrisahs from the later category were less problematic. Though this category was comparatively benign in terms of breeding militants, however, they encouraged sectarianism, which was well in the knowledge of the authorities. There is evidence that the establishment had all the information regarding the activities of the schools and the problems they were causing. Reports produced by the state functionaries in the early 1990s had clearly identified these madrisahs as fanning sectarian hatred and violence (38). Nonetheless, governments chose to remain silent over the issue. (in Asian Affairs nº17 – Can Pakistan turn around) She adds that funding of madrisahs has been provided in the past by the government because groups cooperating with the military in fighting proxy wars ran some of the prominent madrisahs. In any case, the present government does not seem more inclined that the previous military ones to divert resources from defense or to cut down non-development expenditure to invest in education and human resource development.