ASIAN AFFAIRS INTERVIEW WITH KIM DAE-JUNG President of the Republic of Korea THE POLITICAL CHAOS The interview was carried out in the Spring 1999. Two years later, where do we stand? Kim Dae-jung is still battling with the fall-out of the chaebols' demise. Daewoo and Hyundai have been basically dismantled, but the price has been colossal and the sense of crisis that prevailed in 1999 is still very much around. As for his political agenda, on the domestic front, it is still complete chaos. The opposition controls the Parliament as his party lost the parliamentary election and his allies deserted him. Even his sunshine policy was nearly derailed by the Bush administration in its early days. His biggest failure, however, is on the constitutional front. Unwilling or unable to implement his promises to change the way the Executive is working, he has not changed the way South Korea is governed. All the powers remain concentrated on the Presidency. Kim Dae-jung cannot be elected for a second term and therefore he will leave his presidency with a mixed legacy. On November 8, 2001, KIm Dae-Jung stepped down as head of his political party, the Millennium party, to endorse the lass of three parliamentary by-elections to the opposition Grand National Party that now controls 136 seats, one short of the single majority, while Kim Dae-jung support remains at 118 seats. Without the political machinery to sustain his policies in the un-up to the Presidential election, Kim Dae-Jung might fade in irrelevance long before the end of his term in February 2003. Serge Berthier.- Korea has registered a spectacular economic rebound in 1999 engineered by the drastic decisions your government took in 1998 and in the first part of the 1999. Nevertheless, there is today a growing criticism about the lack of progress in the political arena. None of the political reforms you promised during your presidential campaign have been attempted. The cabinet system that was supposed to replace the strong presidential system you have inherited to give more authority to the Prime Minister is basically abandoned or pushed back to an uncertain date. Fresh public suspicions have arisen about your commitment to reform the public sector. What, if anything, is going wrong with such reforms? Kim Dae-jung.- First of all, I must say that during the first year of my government, we were so preoccupied with overcoming the financial crisis under the supervision of the IMF that we really had no time or peace of mind to deal with political reforms. And this year, the primary consideration has been the growing unemployment as a result of the restructuring. Also, top of our mind has been the North-South relationship. So we had actually little time to focus on the political sector reforms. SB.- Certainly, but the crisis was already in full blast while the presidential campaign was going on, and the North-South issue is not a new issue either. So, such preoccupations were not unexpected, you would agree? KDj.- Of course, that is an explanation but it is no excuse and I agree with you entirely that little has been done in terms of political reforms. SB.- There are certainly multiple reasons why the reforms you promised did not come about, and while I don’t expect you to expose all of them, could you just tell us the most essential ones, besides the fact that there were many pressing issues to tackle on the economic front. KDj.- It is simple. The greatest reason for that lack of progress is the fact that out of 299 seats in the National Assembly, the ruling camp has 135 (1). We do not have the majority required for the reforms I wanted . SB.- Nevertheless, the coalition has a majority in the National Assembly. KDj.- The ruling camp is made of two parties, my own and the other partner in the joint government (2). Since we are different parties, we tend to differ on certain issues and we tend not to go along at the same pace, so this also has been a reason why the reforms have been delayed. But more fundamentally, the greatest reason has been that we were not able to win the cooperation of the opposition. SB.- The Korean people are in favor of an overhaul of their political system. They have a very low opinion of their politicians. The opposition party must be aware of this mood. Why does it decline to cooperate with your government to engineer a reform which goes beyond partisan interests? KDj.- Mostly because of the so-called “tax scandal” which goes back to the campaign period of 1997. Some of the leaders of the then ruling party, today the opposition party, were involved in a scandal in which they had the Office of National Tax Administration (ONTA) threaten companies to donate money to their campaign fund. In return they had promised to deliver tax-breaks and benefits to the corporate entities going along. It was all done secretively but later on it was exposed. Today the law enforcement authorities are investigating. So far, as of now, we have evidence that they have amassed about 16.6 billion won through such secretive means. Furthermore through the process of the investigation we learned that many of the leading members of the now opposition party have been involved in this incident (3). SB.- The opposition leaders are claiming that it is a ploy to oppress them, a political vendetta to kill them off. KDj.- Of course, they claim it is a ploy. But Lee Hoi-sung, the younger brother of the then ruling party’s president has been involved. He was arrested and is now on trial (4). Then the deputy chief of ONTA at that time, Lee Suj-hee, ran off to the United States. So far, he refuses to return. And the person who was in charge of the campaign financing in 1997 of the then ruling party went in hiding for ten months. He has recently been caught (5). SB.- Has he confessed to what you allege? KDj.- The opposition leadership is very concerned of what he might say and confess after such a long time on the run. So they want to go on a preemptive strike by calling the affair a ploy of the government party to oppress the opposition camp. But I firmly believe that no democratic country would allow such an attempt to use the National Taxation administration to collect funds for a party’s own interest. SB.- I agree, however as long as the leadership of the opposition party feels it will end up in court, its prime consideration will be survival and certainly not a look at the future. KDj.- Yes and so, the taxation scandal is a problem. Nevertheless we considered that issue separate from our willingness to talk and cooperate with the opposition leadership. SB.- You may consider it a separate issue, but do they? KDj.- No. Their attitude has caused the National Assembly to be immobilized. I admit that we are not able to run the National Assembly. The two parties in the ruling camp have a bare majority. We can convene the sessions, but immediately the opposition will come and get in the way of the running of the Assembly. And when we try to pass a legislation on the floor, their members will come and physically detain us from passing the legislation. At one point, we had the speaker of the National Assembly (Park Jyun-ku) unable to preside in his own chair. He presided over the passing of legislation elsewhere in the assembly floor, in the corridors. Legislation was passed, but then the opposition argued that it was done with irregularities, that there was a unilateral ramming through of bills and they protested against that (6). SB.- You have been in the opposition for a long time. So you know what it is to fight the ruling party. So all this should not come as a very big surprise? KDj.- Indeed. As difficult as the opposition party has been to deal with, I know the pain to be in the opposition has caused me. That is why I am patient. I have no intention to cause or inflict any pain or any disadvantage. SB.- Let us assume that for political considerations, you drop the issue of the funding of the presidential campaign of 1997. How sure are you that the opposition party would then be cooperative? KDj.- I am sure that if I decided to drop the matter, then the opposition party will come and be cooperative but in light of the people’s will, who want the investigation to proceed, it cannot be dropped. The issue of the Tax scandal involving the National Tax office cannot go away. We will have to deal with it. SB.- If I summarize the situation, the National Assembly does not work and the opposition party is tainted by a scandal which threatens its leaders. As long as the opposition feels insecure, it will continue its political guerrilla. As new elections are due in April 2000 to renew the National Assembly, can we say that the current government is a lame-duck one waiting for the next election to make the difference? KDj.- I am not so pessimistic. First of all, we continue to be patient with the opposition. Now bare as it is, we still have a majority in the assembly. With this majority, and without the cooperation of the opposition, if we decide certain laws must be passed, we can do so according to the National Assembly’s rules. But for now, we continue to be patient, we continue to try to persuade the opposition to cooperate, and we must say that in certain cases, the opposition has cooperated in passing some legislation. SB.- Your patience is laudable but how long can you wait without eroding your credibility? KDj.- The opposition knows there is a limitation beyond which it cannot stay so resistant, because it has the public opinion to watch. It has attempted to take its struggle to the streets, motivating outdoor rallies and so forth, but such methods have won very little public response. SB.- Nevertheless, in a recent local election, the opposition leader has come out the winner by a big margin. So, there may be a limitation to his lack of cooperation but this seems valid for both sides. KDj.- Yes. There have been many unfortunate incidents involving for example expensive clothing used as lobbying for the wives of high-government officials, then there was the incident in which a prosecutor has been accused of manipulating a strike at the national mint corporation. Admittedly, many incidents have been detrimental to the government. Nevertheless when we look at the opinion pool today nationwide, the support readings are very much in our favor. We have about twice the support rate from the public than the opposition has at this point. SB.- Such good readings might be due to the economic rebound, but are they sustainable until the parliamentary election in April 2000 by which time the economic performance might have lost some of its shine and the gap between the “haves” and ‘have-nots” widened? KDj.- We won’t stay idle. We have many pieces of legislation pending which are important for the welfare of our people which we intend to pass before April, with or without the cooperation of the opposition. The next regular session of the National Assembly runs from September to December. We have to pass a supplementary budget that will be used for the welfare of the middle-class and the lower classes of the society. We also have to pass the budget for next year. We have a legislation that will create a National Human Rights commission. We have a legislation that the people want very much which is a law against corruption. We have a law that will protect a basic living standard for the people. We have a law that will promote occupational opportunities for handicapped people. We have pending a legislation that will duly reward the families of the democratic fighters that sacrificed their lives for the cause of democracy in the past, we have a law that will open the way to investigate the cause of the deaths that were not clarified under the dictatorial regimes. So all of these pieces of legislation are very much related to political reform, to renew the political climate, so the opposition cannot go on forever in opposing our attempts to pass such laws as people are watching. So, on the one hand, while continuing to try to persuade the opposition to cooperate, we are also looking to mobilize public opinion on our efforts to pass these pieces of legislation before the election. SB.- One of the most criticized laws of the country is the National Security Law, which has allowed the setting-up of dictatorial regimes in the past, in the guise of security. Do you intend to amend it? KDj.- We are working on the revisions of certain articles that can be used to abuse certain rights. SB.- You mentioned earlier that top of your mind was the North-South relationship. Your sunshine policy has not yet delivered much, but don’t you think that as long as North Korea is under an economic blockade, its government is bound to react with a siege mentality that makes it even more difficult to find common ground? One example that comes to mind as regards the efficiency or lack of it of the economic blockade policy as practiced by the United States has been Vietnam. For two decades, the country was under an economic embargo. The result was the boat-people policy, and not the expected fall of the communist government. Ironically, it is the same government which engineered a turn when the embargo started to be ignored by a number of countries that provided a breathing space to give it the leeway necessary to turn-around its economy and open-up. KDj.- Your remark is very interesting. My policy of sunshine is precisely that, to give a breathing space. To say, with fresh air, let’s not fight, let’s not get in another war, but cooperate and enjoy prosperity together. In that, the United States and Japan are entirely with us. However one thing we must say with regard North Korea is that China practices no blockade. In fact, it continues to provide food, oil and coal. But even still, North Korea is not opening up to China. SB.- Maybe China does not have enough to offer, enough to trade with North Korea to make the difference the European countries made as regards Vietnam? KDj.- But look at the assistance that North Korea receives now. The United States are providing 600.000 tons of food assistance, in addition to the assistance they had already provided. In Japan, the pro-North-Korean residents (7) continue to send money to North Korea to the tune of hundreds of millions US dollars a year. As for us, we are sending food and fertilizer, in addition to various economic projects. The Mount Kumsang (8) project alone is worth 100 million US$ in cash flow in North Korea. That idea of giving what North Korea needs and its government giving in return what we want, is something I strongly requested that we do to the Americans and to the Japanese. And they are in agreement that it is what we should do vis-à-vis North Korea. SB.- What do you want then, and what do you think North Korea needs? KDj.- Let me say first that our policy has also the full support of President Jiang Zemin. It was clearly expressed during my meeting last year with him. In our joint-statement, the Chinese say that there must not be war on the Korean peninsula, and that there must be cooperation and exchanges between South and North Korea which is entirely in line with our policy. They reiterated their view to the nº2 of North Korea, the Chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People’s Congress, Mr. Kim Yong-nan, when he recently visited Beijing. To Mr. Kim, President Jiang advised again that there must not be war on the Korean Peninsula, that the South and North Korea should resolve their issues through dialogues. And also that North Korea must get along, entering into improved relations with United States, Japan and the European countries. The Chinese government openly made it known to its public media, that it has told the North Korean delegation such things. Dr. William Perry, the US coordinator on US policies who was recently in North Korea, told the North Korean leadership that the three countries (South Korea, United States and Japan) are willing to cooperate if it is also willing to cooperate, and once it made that decision, that we will render all the assistance that it needs. SB.- I understand, but one of the main concerns of North Korea is its sovereignty, since the country has been written off many times in the American media, year after year. Would you guarantee its security? KDj.- Yes. One of the things that we would provide the North is the guarantee of its security. We are also willing to treat it as a responsible member of the international community if it comes out of its isolation. We also offered economic assistance in terms of the lifting of economic sanctions, in terms of Japanese compensation for the past colonial age which will be a great amount of money, in terms of South Korean investments in the country. SB.- That is what you offer. But what price the North Korean government would have to pay? KDj.- In return, North Korea must keep to its pledge that it will not develop nuclear weapons, secondly that it will restrain its missile development and sale of missiles that threaten peace. Thirdly while we would undertake that South Korea will not engage in military adventures vis-à-vis the North, by the same token, the North should enter into the same commitment not to engage in military provocation vis-à-vis the South. SB.- Why is North Korea not responsive so far to such proposal which seems fair and must be attractive to a country in dire straits? KDj.- Indeed, with such a good proposal that China and Russia support, why is the leadership not responding? My view is that the North Korean regime fears, by accepting such proposal which will result in the opening up to the outside world, that it will lead to the people discovering what the world is like thus realizing that they have been told lies all these past decades. It might make it very difficult for the regime to sustain. SB.- In politics, you know first-hand that there is always a risk to change a status-quo, but clearly status-quo never last for ever, especially when you run out of money. Surely the North Koreans know that. KDj.- Another reason, and maybe the strongest one, is that the military is very much in control of all aspects of life. It is in control of the factories and much of the economic apparatus. The military does not want an opening-up. It has vested interests in all areas of the society. In fact, it benefits by keeping the tension at a certain level. It reinforces its raison d’être and its vested interests. So the people who move North Korea from within are very different from the people diplomats meet in Geneva. The people you meet in Geneva may feel they agree with you deep inside, but when they return home, they are unable to speak for fear they might be sacked. SB.- If this is the case, what can you expect? Why be patient if the military is not going to let the country open up in order to protect its position and vested interests? KDj.- Kim Jung-il (9) who is very much in control with full backing of the military, is taking the wrong option. Because both are making unwise decisions, every passing day the situation is deteriorating and getting worse and worse. The North Korean economy is devastated. The factories’ rate of production is at this point about 20%. Their roads, their railways, their port facilities are all ruined. They have very little electricity. Satellite pictures taken at night of the Korean peninsula show that the Northern part is very dark while the Southern part is very bright. Why be patient? As you know the raison d’être of communism and socialism is that the government provides for the needs of the people. Communist and socialist governments are able to rule over the people with absolute power because the economy they command is to provide for food, clothing and shelter for everyone. That is the theory. Of course, the North Korean regime is unable to provide any of these at this point. The whole communist system is breaking down. The North Koreans are suffering. Hundred of thousands of them are dying or suffering from malnutrition every year. The people are roaming the countryside in search of whatever food they can find. Some are risking their lives trying to cross the rivers to the Chinese side, to Manchuria. Some are resorting to robbery to survive. In the past, the North Korean population was very much controlled. They could not leave their own county without a permit, but now the people do not care less. They are in search of food. It is a question of life and death and the authorities seem to allow the people to roam wherever they might find food. SB.- What you imply is that the whole communist control is slowly disintegrating. Could we interpret such relaxation of the rules as a step in the right direction? KDj.- Why not. I believe our position must be one of patience to try to persuade North Korea. Many say that our sunshine policy has no results, that North Korea is not responsive at all. But it is incorrect. North Korea has shown some response. There has been progress in all areas. Take the example of the tourism project. It was something that was unthinkable in the past. North Korea has allowed many more of our South Korean citizens to visit in the past year. It has also agreed to revive the military armistice commission talks at the truce village of Panmumgon under a different name. It is called now the General Officers’s meeting, so that channel has been revived (10). Given this new developments and given the deteriorating situation in North Korea and its increasing dependence on outside assistance, if we stay the course with patience, we should be able to induce North Korea to change. Of course, one might say that the sunshine policy has not been as effective as I expected it to be, but on the other hand everybody agrees that there is no better alternative to sunshine to engage vis-à-vis the North. SB.- There has been a serious incident in June in the West Sea with the sinking of a North Korean patrol boat and the deaths of many sailors (11). What do you make of this incident? KDj.- Some say that such incident is the mark of a political infighting in North Korea, supposedly to derail the vice-ministerial talks in Beijing. It is an interpretation. As we mentioned earlier, the North Korean people one meets in Geneva or at other diplomatic venues are the kind of people who have agreed to go along with the tourism project, they are the kind of people who agree to the vice-ministerial talks in Beijing, they are the ones who would go along with the opening. When they come up with these agreements with the outside world, there are other forces inside the regime that are trying to ruin everything, and do ruin everything from time to time. Then the process has to start again. This time, in the recent exchange of fire with the North in the West Sea, I think that the North had its fingers burned by this incident. It started as a military confrontation but it was very promptly and completely repelled by our naval forces. Now I think it must have been a shock to the North authorities to be so completely defeated. So some people must be thinking that they cannot go along by concentrating on their military forces alone. In terms of the military balance, the situation is increasingly in this disfavor. But how much of a lesson did they learn by this incident? That we do not know. But I am sure that this complete defeat has come to them as quite a shock. We will continue to have this stance. If they cooperate and strengthen the peace on the peninsula, we will return with whatever assistance they need and that we can provide. But if they continue with provocative measures such as perhaps another missile firing, we will teach them a lesson that they have nothing to gain by being so provocative in order that they realize that the pain they inflict on themselves is not worth it. SB.- There are rumours that North Korea is indeed about to proceed to test-firing of a long range missile? It is what you call a provocative action, while the North Korean government argues that it is its sovereign rights. Would you suspend your sunshine policy if it does carry out the test? KDj.- The outcome will be a coordinated response between South Korea, United States and Japan and it will bring very painful consequences to North Korea. Notwithstanding such a lesson, we will be very steady in saying that the Geneva Framework must be maintained (12) and the KEDO project must go on as planned, and to answer your question about the sunshine policy, we will be keeping our tenor of engagement with North Korea. SB.- The Japanese Diet recently approved a revised security agreement with the United States which does not please China because Taiwan was not mentioned as being exclusively left out of the field of the agreement which calls for the Japanese armed forces to support the US military during a regional crisis. Then, only weeks later, we are lurching in a regional crisis with the Taiwanese leadership asserting that its relationship with China is a state-to-state relation (13). What do you make of it? KDj.- I am not expert on military affairs and I might not have the right answer for you. One thing is that Taiwan is a part of China, a thing that the United States recognized and that we recognized in the process of normalizing our relationship with China. The second thing is that the new guide-lines of the Japan-US agreement must not be implemented to the detriment of the Japanese peace constitution, to the detriment of the non-nuclear free principles, and to the detriment of the defense posture of the self-defense forces of Japan. SB.- That is what everyone wants, but in all fairness, if it were the case, why would the old agreement be revamped since it was in line with what you just said? KDj.- The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Obuchi, was recently in Beijing to discuss with Mr. Jiang. Upon his return he called me and briefed me about the talks he had with Mr. Jiang. He said he had an extensive discussion and very effectively explained the Japanese position. He believes he had a fruitful dialogue with Mr. Jiang. I, personally, greatly welcome Japanese and Chinese efforts to promote their joint interests. SB.- South Korea is a staunch supporter of the United States in this part of the world. There are more than 35,000 American troops in the country. Are they going to stay for ever? KDj.- As long as there is a military threat from the North, the alliance between South Korea and the United States will remain strong and stable. In sum, it is very important for peace in the Korean Peninsula and for peace in the Northern part of Asia that United States, Japan and China have harmonious and smooth relations and that they continue to increase the basis of their joint-interests. South Korea will do what it can to develop things in that direction. Summer 1999 Notes: 1 - President Kim Dae-jung was elected by a narrow majority on 18th December 1997, with 40.3% of the votes. His main opponent, Lee Hoi-chang (Grand National Party, conservative, a merger of New Korea Party, conservative and Democratic Party, liberal), got 38.7%, while Rhee In-je (New People’s Party) got 19.2%, Kwon Young-gil (People’s Victory) 1.2%, Shin Jeong-yil (Unification Korea Party) 0.2%, Kim Han Shik (Right Politics for a Right Country) 0.2% and Hur Kyung Young (Republican Party) 0.2%. It was Kim Dae-jung’s fourth try, and the first time in South Korea’s history that an opposition party won the Presidency. Legislative by-elections were held on February 21, 1998. Altogether, the coalition now has 160 seats (105 NCNP and 55 ULD) and claims to have the support of five more members (see interview with Chung Woo-taik in this issue).The opposition has 130, with 4 seats being held by independents on a total of 299 seats. Kim Dae-jung doesn’t have a majority by himself in the unicameral assembly, so he has no choice but to find common grounds with the ULD legislators. 2 -The United Liberal Democrats party (ULD) was launched on February 21, 1995, and held its inaugural national convention on March 30. 50 ULD candidates were elected National Assembly members of the National Assembly on April. 11, 1996. On June 2, 1997, the ULD held its first Ordinary Party Convention during which Kim Jong-pil was appointed the party’s presidential candidate. Then, on November 3, 1997, United Liberal Democrats and National Congress for New Politics, the party of Kim Dae-jung, agreed on unifying presidential candidates. At the 2nd Central Committee Convention held on November 21, 1997, Kim Jong-pil was appointed honorary President of the ULD while Park Tae Jun replaced him as acting President. Unified opposition presidential candidate Kim Dae-jung was elected on December 18, 1997. A coalition government, with United Liberal Democrats and National Congress for New Politics was launched on February 25, 1998, and Kim Jong-pil was then appointed Prime Minister. 3 - On the day Lee Hoi-chang assumed the presidency of the GNP, it was revealed that previous to the 1997 presidential election, his associates from the then ruling party pressured some Korean groups to fund his campaign in exchange for lenience and rebates from the Tax Office. M. Suh Sang-mok, who was Lee Hoi-chang’s campaign fund manager, was accused of using the Tax Office to mobilize funds. Later, M. Suh denied that Lee Hoi-chang had prior knowledge of the campaign fund-for-tax-favor deal. He acknowledged collecting campaign funds from business tycoons but he said the money was gathered before the revision of the political fund law was made on November 14, 1997. The prosecution suspects that Representatives Kang Sam-jae and Kim Tae-ho, two key figures in the GNP campaign funding, were involved in the illegal campaign funding. According to the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office (SDPO), part of the campaign fund, which was managed by Lee Suk-hee, former deputy chief of the Office of National Tax Administration (ONTA), was used by 10 people, including the wives of five GNP lawmakers. So far, in its investigations into the GNP’s illegal fund-raising, the prosecution found the opposition party collected at least 16.6 billion won from public and private corporations through the ONTA and the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP). 4 - Investigators said Lee Hoi-sung, the younger brother of the GNP leader, and Lee Suk-hee, former deputy chief of the National Tax Administration Office, were involved in the so-called “tax-theft scandal.” Lee Hoi-sung is now standing trial on charges of pressuring business tycoons to donate campaign funds. After an overnight interrogation of Kim Tae-won, a former financial director at the GNP, prosecutors confirmed that he had cooperated with Suh Sang-mok to ask some tax officials to collect campaign funds for Lee Hoi-chang illegally. 5 - Suh Sang-mok turned down prosecution summonses at least three times while denouncing the investigation and calling it a politically motivated ploy to victimize the opposition. He finally presented himself to the prosecutor’s office on September 13, 1998. He kept denying he had applied pressure on the Tax Office: “I accepted campaign funds from some business operators thanks to the assistance of Lee Suk-hee, deputy head of ONTA, but I believed Lee did so willingly in order to help our party”. Asked why he gave up his resistance to questioning, Suh said, “I decided to shed light on the campaign fund scandal because the prosecution is flagrantly distorting and exaggerating the case, and the ruling camp is taking political advantage of it.” Lee Suk-hee, who is still in the United States, was once Suh Sang-mok’s high school classmate. He is widely believed to hold the key to determining the size of the GNP campaign fund, and answering the pivotal question of the role Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP leader and unsuccessful candidate in the December election, played in the illegal fund-raising activities. 6 - GNP lawmakers often occupy Incumbent House Speaker Park Jyun-kyu’s office to prevent him from presiding over a House session at which the ruling party intends to pass controversial bills. On May 5, 1999, the coalition ruling camp’s railroading of government restructuring legislation and three other bills through the National Assembly was the second forceful, unilateral passage of legislative bills by the ruling camp since the inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil’s coalition government in February last year. Kim also took the lead in ramming through bills at House sessions in January 1999. The vice speaker, unable to take the speaker’s seat in the face of its occupation by opposition lawmakers, took the gavel and wireless microphone to his floor seat, put the bills to a vote and declared the bills passed in a seven minutes process. Since coming to power, the NCNP has copied the “railroading tactics” of the previously ruling Grand National Party, while the GNP has used the same “offensive tactics” formerly used by the NCNP when it was the opposition party. Lawmaker Hwang Nak-joo of the opposition GNP, former National Assembly speaker, was for a time in 1996 constantly stalked by determined NCNP lawmakers who were eager to block the controversial labor law and other bills. Now their roles have been completely reversed. In times of bipartisan confrontation over the impending passage of contentious bills, the speaker’s residence was frequently seized by opposition lawmakers and Assembly speakers were even stalked by opposition lawmakers when they went to the restroom. For example, to pass the controversial labor bills in the late 1996, lawmakers of the then ruling New Korea Party headed by President Kim Young-sam were ordered to assemble in separate groups at various places in Seoul in. They then made their way by bus to the Assembly, where they passed the bills in the absence of the opposition. Railroading legislation has a long history in Korea. The first case of this parliamentary practice was committed by former president Syngman Rhee in 1952. Through the constant struggles on the House floor against military dictatorships, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung earned fame and built their statures as opposition leaders by using “offensive tactics". When Kim Young-sam became president, Kim Dae-jung was the opposition leader and led moves to obstruct the passage of such contentious bills as labor laws, which were intended to allow employers to conduct mass layoffs, the legislation which was eventually adopted after his 1997 presidential election victory. It has become the rule that the Assembly undergoes a certain period of lull after the ruling camp railroads one or more bills and that House operations return to normal after a summit between the President and opposition leader. Typically, the President makes some concessions to certain opposition demands. The GNP’s attempt to block the current ruling camp’s attempt to pass its legislation in the first place is a negation of the principle of majority rule. Yet, the GNP argues that their blockade was inevitable in light of the ruling camp’s authoritarian methods, which include “recruiting” opposition lawmakers through blackmail and using other coercive means to attain the House majority. 7 - As of the end of December 1996, a total of 657,159 Koreans were living in Japan, comprising 46.44 percent of all the foreigners resident in this country, with more than 170.000 of them living in Osaka alone. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), controls Chongryun, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan that it founded in 1955, which central headquarters are located in Tokyo. This organization oversees 22 member organizations and runs 28 concerns and 143 regular schools from primary level to a university for ethnic Korean minority in Japan. Among other activities, Chongryun organizes tours to North Korea for Korean Japanese and is possibly the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s main fund raising channel in Japan. 8 - Since November 1998, Hyundai Asian Corporation is operating cruise ships that transport South Korean tourists to mount Kumgang, a scenic North Korean mountain. The Agreement between Hyundai and North Korea is viewed as a breakthrough in North-South relations. Hyundai has already paid 158 million US$ to the North since last November for the exclusive right to organize tours to the mount Kumgang, and is paying a 8 million US$ monthly fee. More than 80.000 tourists have already visited the mount Kumgang since November 1998, and after a one month halt to the cruises due to the detention by North Korea’s authorities of a South Korean tourist, the tours resumed in July 1999. According to a contract between Hyundai and its Northern business counterpart signed in June 1998, North Korea agreed not to detain South Korean tourists, even if they failed to observe the North’s traditions and practices or abide by North Korea’s social and moral obligations. 9 - Kim Jong-il, is officially only a Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau as well as the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chairman of the National Defense Commission and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army. Born on February 16, 1942, he attended Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang from September 1960 to March 1964. While working in the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea from June 1964, Kim Jong-il filled various positions until he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK in September 1973 and Member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Party in February 1974. Kim Jong-il was elected Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee at the Sixth Congress of the WPK in October 1980. He was, after February 1982, elected Deputy to the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK. He was elected First Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK in May 1990, its Chairman in April 1993 and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army in December 1991. He was awarded the title of Marshal of the DPRK in April 1992. After Kim Il-sung died in July 1994, speculations ran high on how much control his son and heir had over the military and the Workers Party of Korea, especially since it was first expected he would step into the leading post of Secretary General of the WPK around October 10, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the North Korean ruling Party. Kim Jong-il was officially confirmed as the supreme ruler of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea when he was sworn in as Secretary General on October 8, 1997. The delay, which was first thought to be a sign of his weakness and tensions within the leadership, actually enabled Kim Jong-il to devote himself to consolidating his position with the military. He already had a strong support base and network in the WPK but no military background, so gaining control of the military was of decisive importance in confirming his position. Kim Il-sung was aware that lack of military connections was his son’s weak point, so he started transferring power to Kim Jung-il by having him named to posts that gave him influence over the military, including the title of supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army in 1991. These moves ensured Kim Jong-il a position from which he could proceeded to enhance his authority through day-to-day military leadership and promotion of officers to senior ranks. 10 -On June 15, 1999, General Officers of the United Nations Command and North Korea met in Panmunjon to discuss the latest naval confrontation between South Korean and the North Korean naval forces on the Northern Limit Line, a buffer zone in the West Sea. According to Col. Carl Kropf, the UNC’s spokesman, “The primary objective of the meeting was to seek a resolution to the situation off Korea’s West Coast and reduce tensions in that area”. Representing the UNC were Maj. Gen. Michael M. Dunn of the United States, Brig. Gen. Keu Ki-yeun of South Korea and two other UNC generals. North Korea was represented by Lt. Gen. Li Chan-bok and two other generals. During the talks, UNC generals recommended that both sides withdraw their naval forces to their respective sides of the Northern Limit Line, expressing concern that continued naval intrusions could further escalate tensions in the region. The Northern delegates were unofficially reported as demanding that South Korea provide compensation for damages incurred to their ships during a ship-to-ship collision in the West Sea on June 11. 11 - On June 15, South Korean warships sank one North Korean torpedo boat and badly damaged several others in the first serious naval clash between the two Koreas in the West Sea since the 1950-53 Korean War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said four North Korean patrol boats and three torpedo ships intruded into South Korean waters and opened fire with 25-mm cannons on Southern boats. The confrontation occurred after days of naval incidents and standoffs between North Korean fishing boats and Southern forces The 1953 Armistice Agreement only addresses the border alongside the 155-mile land demarcation line separating the two Koreas without any provisions on the sea border. 12 -The “Geneva Framework”, under which the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea, was agreed on in 1994. The KEDO project, which will cost 4.6 billion US$, is mainly funded by the United States, Japan and South Korea. The project is designed to offer North Korea an alternative to the nuclear program it was previously developing, which included production of plutonium, an essential component of nuclear weapons designs. Three key KEDO members, South Korea, Japan and the United States, are seeking to launch full-fledged construction work in cooperation with other KEDO member states. Seoul is steadily supporting the KEDO project for fear its derailment would prompt Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons “within months”, using the plutonium it has allegedly secured before the 1994 Geneva agreement. 13 - On July 9, 1999, The president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, declared that the relationships between Taiwan and Mainland China should develop on a “state to state basis”. His remark infuriated Beijing, which considers Taiwan as a renegade province, and tensions rose significantly in the Taiwan Strait as both sides maintained their positions. Most countries in the World, including South Korea and the United States officially abide by Beijing’s “One China policy”, which means they recognize People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate political authority and government of China. Following Lee Teng Hui’s statement, which was widely perceived as provocative and motivated by Taiwanese local political developments, most countries in the region and the world confirmed their commitment to the “One China Policy”. Summer 1999 | |||
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