ASIAN AFFAIRS ON INDONESIA

Dewi Fortuna Anwar - Research Director - Habibie Institute

THE AFTERMATH OF THE GUSDUR ELECTION

As in many other societies that have endured a long period of authoritarianism which suppressed dissent, and smoothed over differences with enforced and artificially created harmony and uniformity, the sudden collapse of authoritarian rule led to a period of uncertainty and near anarchy in Indonesia. Distrust of the government and everything to do with state authority were compounded by the economic crises which did not only pit the state against the people, but even more dangerously led to increasing horizontal conflicts among peoples from different racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds.

In a society as heterogeneous as Indonesia the prolonged economic crises not only led to political crises which washed away the raison d’être and the legitimacy of the New Order government, but even more seriously the crises have eroded the very foundation of the unitary state which is based on mutual respect and tolerance of the existing differences. Of equal importance, the end of authoritarian rule and the euphoria of liberalization that ensued seemingly led to a political free for all among the political elites in their competition to fill the power vacuum left by President Suharto.

Despite Indonesia’s firm determination to establish democracy and the success of the general elections of 7th June 1999, the country’s first truly free and democratic general elections since 1955, it became increasingly clear that the open competition for power had led to a widening polarization between the political elites and their followers, reminiscent of the social and political fragmentation of the late 1950's and early 1960’s. New grudges due to differences during the New Order and its aftermath cut across old social-political cleavages based on ideological orientations, particularly between secular nationalists and modernist Muslims. These differences do not only divide the political elites in Jakarta, but are even more keenly felt at the grassroots level of society. As such political competition and the possibility of winning or losing an election became much more charged than would normally be the case in a more mature democracy. A civilized, democratic and transparent presidential election by an electoral college of 700 lawmakers at one level was being threatened by threats of revolution, jihad and mob violence at another level if the MPR were to make the “wrong choice”.

It became quite clear that as the presidential election grew nearer the confrontation between the two top contenders for the presidency, President B.J. Habibie of Golkar and Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDI-P, and their respective followers threatened to bring the country into a new round of political crisis. While the presidential and the vice-presidential election by a democratically elected MPR was seen as the key to political stability in Indonesia, there was an ominous sign that the stakes became even higher as neither the supporters of Habibie nor of Megawati seemed to be willing to accept the victory of the other.

Despite the various fundamental reforms that he had carried out successfully, particularly in the political field, President Habibie continued to be seen as a carry-over of the New Order regime which made it extremely difficult for him to court popular support among the students and the intellectual community in Jakarta. In contrast, notwithstanding their many shortcomings, Wahid and Megawati have not been tainted with association with the New Order and its KKN practices, and on top of that they are both populist figures with a large following who have long been seen as leaders of the counter-elites.

Recognizing this danger of open social and political conflicts which clearly threaten Indonesia’s nascent democracy, Amien Rais formed the so-called Central Axis, composed of several Muslim-based parties in the MPR, and nominated the much revered moderate Muslim leader K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid as the alternative presidential candidate. Wahid has long been a political force in his own right, a rare Renaissance man rooted in traditional Islam with a large and devoted following, yet a modern intellectual who is known for his tolerance of other faiths and his championing of minorities. Long a firm believer in democracy Wahid has also continued to cultivate good relations with the military as well as with Suharto and his family. Compared to the other two presidential candidates Wahid was the candidate who was most acceptable to the various opposing political groups, or the candidate who encountered the least resistance among both the elites and the common people. Wahid has been a firm supporter of Megawati and lately has also developed close relations with Habibie as well as with Amien Rais, which reflects a growing rapprochement between traditional and modernist Islamic groups in Indonesia. It is important to note that relations between traditionalist Muslims as embodied in Nahdatul Ulama (NU) led by Abdurrahman Wahid and modernist Muslims as embodied in Muhammadiyah/Masyumi/ICMI to which Amien Rais and Habibie belong have historically been at odds with each other. Therefore, Amien Rais’ sponsorship of Wahid was indeed a major historic shift which will mark a new beginning in NU-Muhammadiyah relations in the coming years.

Although intellectuals have argued that as Indonesia moves towards democracy the focus should be on developing democratic systems and institutions rather than on personalities, it cannot be denied that at this early stage of its democratic transition Indonesians remain transfixed by personalities. Wahid’s victory over Megawati, paved by Habibie’s withdrawal from the presidential race after his accountability speech was rejected by the MPR, has succeeded in both defusing the political tension and in consolidating democracy, as the MPR’s decision was accepted by the public at large with the exception of a number of Megawati’s supporters.

While Megawati’s election to the vice presidency is seen by some as giving in to mob violence, there is little doubt that to exclude her from the sharing of power would only perpetuate her image as a martyr and make national reconciliation difficult to achieve. After all, the PDI-P won the largest number of seats in parliament and until Megawati’s election as Vice-President her party had failed to win any of the prestigious positions that were being fought over by the contending political parties. The chairmanship of the powerful MPR was won by Amien Rais from PAN/Central Axis, the chairmanship of the DPR by Akbar Tanjung of Golkar, while the top prize, the presidency was won unexpectedly by the frail yet venerable K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid of PKB, after winning the majority of the votes in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).

With Wahid as President and Megawati Sukarnoputri, the woman Wahid defeated in the presidential race, as Vice-President, Indonesia now has both constitutionally and politically legitimate national leaders with strong grassroots support. Thus, the democratic election of the President and the Vice-President finally brought to an end a drawn out period of political uncertainty, making it possible for the government and the Indonesian people as a whole to concentrate on resolving the various social, political and economic crises that the country continues to face, the demand for change at the top political level as a sign of a clear break from the past being now met with the election of the two top opposition leaders to the national leadership.

However, recognizing the serious political polarization and the need to have a stable government, President Wahid has created the so-called “National Unity” cabinet in which every major party in parliament is represented. The fact that President Wahid’s own party only came fourth in the general elections, and that his elevation to the presidency is primarily due to the support of Amien Rais and the Central Axis rather than his own National Awakening Party (PKB) plus the backing of Golkar, has forced President Wahid to consult closely with party leaders in forming his cabinet. Each ministerial appointment has reportedly come with a guarantee from either Amien Rais (Central Axis), Akbar Tanjung (Golkar), Megawati (PDI-P), Wiranto (military) or Wahid himself.

Although in theory Indonesia has a presidential system and according to the Constitution members of the cabinet are appointed by the president and responsible only to him, in practice the current system is more like a quasi-parliamentary system as the President and Vice-President are elected and can be dismissed by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), while most of the ministers reflect the power composition in the MPR/DPR.

Under the current system the DPR or parliament has 500 members (462 directly elected and 38 appointed from the military+police), while the MPR has 700 members composed of the DPR, regional representatives (5 from each province and elected by the provincial legislatures) and 65 functional or sectoral representatives appointed by the General Elections Committee.

It is generally agreed that despite the increasing power and independence of the MPR and DPR which have the functions to control and limit the power of the Executive, President Wahid’s government is likely to become fundamentally stable and strong due to the participation of all of the major parties in the cabinet. In fact, the concerns among intellectuals in Indonesia are now centered on the lack of clear opposition to the government in parliament, which is detrimental to the development of democracy. President Wahid’s inclusive and solidarity-making style of leadership tends to include and coopt not just potential opposition figures in parliament, but also various NGOs who are asked to participate in government projects.

Nevertheless, it is also recognized that the needs for national reconciliation and the formation of a stable government are at the moment of primary importance. Indonesian democratic consolidation is not considered to be seriously endangered by the establishment of a “National Unity” cabinet because of the increasing empowerment and independence of individual members of parliament, the freedom of the press and of association and the strengthening of civil society as a whole. Of even greater importance, the power of the executive is in the process of being severely curtailed through the amendment of the 1945 Constitution which is now under way. It is also important to note that the strengthening of democratic institutions, particularly through the enforcement of civilian supremacy over the military, is also being carried out seriously. The President has once again separated the position of the Minister of Defense from the Commander of the Defense Forces, and for the first time since the 1950’s the Minister of Defense is a civilian. Moreover, under a regulation passed during President Habibie’s tenure military officers appointed to political positions have to resign from the military, thus removing one of the chief complaints regarding the military’s dual functions.

Although the establishment of the new government in Indonesia under President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati through a genuinely democratic process, and widely accepted as such by both the domestic and the international communities, has restored the legitimacy and credibility of the Indonesian government and provided a sound footing for the government to move forward, it has to deal with the multidimensional crises that have engulfed Indonesia, which include the threat of national disintegration and prolonged economic crises.

President Wahid has outlined a number of policy initiatives which are primarily aimed at maintaining national unity and speeding up Indonesia’s economic recovery as well as enhancing Indonesia’s national dignity. To promote regional autonomy and overcome the various regional troubles such as secessionist movements and communal conflicts that now beset the country, the government has taken a number of steps such as:

- the continued implementation of regional autonomy which has been initiated by President B.J. Habibie through the application of Law 22, 1999 on regional government and Law 25, 1999 on fiscal balance. - the establishment of a new Ministry for Regional Autonomy which will oversee the implementation of the devolution of power from the central to the district government. Under the new law the central government will only have jurisdiction over five areas, namely foreign policy, defense, monetary policy, the judiciary and religious affairs.

As a sign of the government’s seriousness in implementing regional autonomy President Wahid has disbanded two important government departments, namely the Department of Information and the Department of Social Affairs, whose functions at the local level will be carried out by the local government. A number of departments have been reduced to ministries without portfolios so that the central government will increasingly only play a coordinating role while most of the tasks of the government will be assumed by the local authorities.

- to promote human rights and deal with complaints about human rights abuses which have been a major cause for regional discontent President Wahid has also created a new ministry for human rights.

Another initiative to deal with various regional troubles is the division of labour between the President and the Vice-President. While in the past the Vice-President was mostly assigned ceremonial tasks, President Wahid has asked Vice-President Megawati to deal with the problems in the eastern part of Indonesia, particularly with the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya and the communal conflicts in the Maluku areas. The President will himself deal with the extremely serious independent movement in Aceh.

Economic recovery is clearly at the top of the government’s agenda besides ensuring national unity. To speed up economic recovery the government has carried out three major reform initiatives which may be considered a departure from the previous government. The first is a more vigorous effort to stamp out collusion, corruption and nepotism, the so-called KKN practices and to promote transparency and good governance. The second is to pay more attention to Indonesia’s maritime potentials as important sources for economic development. The third is the development of a more activist foreign policy which tries to balance Indonesia’s over-dependence on a few major industrialized countries by developing closer ties with China and India. At the same time Indonesia also os also initiating a major foreign policy departure by opening direct trade links with Israel.

Transparency and a government free from collusion, corruption and nepotism (KKN) are key reforms on the agenda that are not only crucial for political recovery but are also the prerequisite for economic recovery. As a totally new government, with only limited links to the previous New Order regime, the current administration has the opportunity to promote good and clean governance in a more serious and credible manner than could be carried out under President B.J. Habibie. Both the government and the parliament are keen and under strong public pressure to resolve such issues as the Bank Bali scandal and the KKN related to former President Suharto and his family. The appointment of the reform-minded Marzuki Darusman as the new Attorney General is seen by analysts as a breath of fresh air which may restore the credibility of the state prosecutor’s office. President Wahid himself has made it clear that he will not tolerate any wrongdoing from his ministers and has asked the Attorney General to be vigilant against KKN practices, including in controlling the behavior of members of the government. Such a commitment to promoting good governance from the top, if consistently carried out, will clearly help to improve Indonesia’s economic efficiency and political accountability.

Another major departure from the previous government is the new administration’s emphasis on maritime affairs. Although Indonesia is popularly known as a “maritime continent” and has struggled to achieve the international recognition of its archipelagic state, the country has in fact paid little attention to the management and utilization of its maritime resources. This lack of attention to its vast territorial waters and exclusive economic zones is reflected in Indonesia’s defense capability which is mostly focused on land, leaving the seas vulnerable to the encroachment of external parties, such as foreign fishermen who reap most of the harvest of Indonesian waters. President Wahid on the other hand recognizes the important contribution that Indonesia’s vast maritime resources can make to the Indonesian economy, particularly to improve the welfare of the country’s traditional fishermen who have mostly wallowed in poverty.

As a manifestation of the new emphasis on maritime affairs the president has established a new Department for Maritime Exploration which will be empowered to gather data, explore and exploit Indonesia’s marine resources. Equally important, for the first time in Indonesia’s history the defense forces are led by an admiral, not an army general. This historic appointment clearly signals the shift in emphasis in Indonesia’s defense outlook from one that primarily focuses on land defense to a more archipelagic defense which will pay equal attention to the development of the navy and the air force.

The most notable policy shift under the new government is undoubtedly in the field of foreign policy. President Wahid has appointed as his Minister of Foreign Affairs the notable scholar on Islam and comparative religions, Dr Alwi Shihab, who was educated in Cairo and the United States and a close associate of the President. President Wahid has shown a close interest in foreign affairs and is committed to improving Indonesia’s international standing and enhancing its bargaining position, while Minister Shihab wishes to use foreign policy as a means to promote Indonesia’s economic interests.

With the East Timor issue mostly out of the way, the new government has a relatively free hand in pursuing Indonesia’s diplomatic interests. President Wahid has clearly shown his strong commitment to ASEAN solidarity by making a tour of ASEAN capitals as his first trip overseas. Nevertheless, the visits to ASEAN countries are informal in nature, while the first state visit of the president will be to China and India. The President has made it very clear that he wishes to strengthen Indonesia’s bilateral relations with China and India, the two largest countries in the world, for both political and economic reasons. The support shown by the Asian countries towards Indonesia during the East Timor crisis has made the Indonesian government realize the importance of Asian solidarity, particularly in facing pressures from the West. At the same time as countries with vast economic potentials which are quite advanced in their technological development, relations with China and India also promise to bring considerable economic benefits to Indonesia.

Furthermore the government has also indicated its strong desire to open direct trade relations with Israel, despite strong opposition from various Islamic groups in Indonesia. The Foreign Minister argues that opening trade ties with Israel has multiple benefits as not only will Indonesia be able to attract investment from Israel and get access to the Israeli market, but even more important Indonesia will be able to tap the huge financial capability of the international Jewish community. The Minister also argues that opening trade links with Israel does not mean abandoning the Palestinian cause as Indonesia will not open diplomatic ties with the Jewish state until the Palestinian question is settled. By opening trade ties with Israel Indonesia also hopes to be able to play a mediating role between Israel and the Palestinians, whose cause has long been championed by Indonesia. It is also important to note that getting closer to Israel does not mean that Indonesia has distanced itself from the Arab and other Muslim countries. In fact Indonesia’s position as a leading Muslim nation has the potential of finally being realized as the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the MPR are all Islamic scholars fluent in Arabic.

It is clearly too early to judge how effective the new government will be in carrying out its heavy responsibilities to overcome the multidimensional crises that have engulfed Indonesia in the past two years. What is important to note, however, is the fact that the new government has a strong political legitimacy and support from the people, while the President is known as a man of vision and high intellectual capability, though at times rather mercurial and unpredictable.

The major challenges faced by Indonesia and the new government

Despite the strong constitutional and political legitimacy of the new government and the general popularity of President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the challenges faced by the new government and the country as a whole remain numerous and enormous. The government does not only have to deal with long embedded structural and systemic problems, but also has to overcome the cabinet’s own shortcomings.

The formation of a “National Unity” cabinet has the advantage of having a wide political base, but at the same time there is a danger that the different political affiliations and interests of the various ministers may reduce the overall effectiveness of the government. As most of the ministers are members of political parties which are all competing against each other to gain the most popular support in preparation for the next election one may question whether there may not be conflicting political loyalties, or even more seriously the possibility of political cliques developing within the government which may try to compete for resources for their own respective political grouping. The diversity of the cabinet members is also likely to make coordination a challenging task, a problem that has always plagued the Indonesian government even when all of the ministers belonged to the same political group. Given President Wahid’s infirmity it is questionable whether he will be able to keep a hands'on approach to government and keep a tight rein on the ministers so that they will all be heading in the same direction.

While the fundamental political problems of Indonesia have been solved and Indonesia is now well on its way towards consolidating its democracy so that future leadership succession should no longer be fraught with danger and a cause for anxiety, Indonesia currently faces an even more dangerous existential problem. The overwhelming demand for referendum in Aceh that is gathering momentum daily threatens the very core of Indonesian foundation and its raison d’être. If the government cannot resolve the Aceh crisis peacefully there are only dark roads ahead for Indonesia which are both unpalatable, either to lose the province which will lead to the loss of other provinces, or to engage in a long and bloody civil war which will not only be greatly damaging domestically, but will undoubtedly undermine Indonesia’s international standing. Regional discontent continues unabated and even has the tendency to grow stronger as a reaction against past injustices and emboldened by the relaxation of central control as well as the general loss of esteem of state apparatus, particularly the military. Indonesia is racing against time to implement all of the necessary reforms designed to win the hearts and minds of the people, particularly in the wealthy outlying areas, and in the case of Aceh there is a serious question whether all of the government offers for enlarged autonomy are not too little, too late.

Reforming the legal system and the bureaucracy is also a daunting task for the government. It is generally agreed that the success of Indonesian reform will largely depend on the nation’s ability to produce a professional and effective bureaucracy and a state of the art legal system. Both of these institutions have long been subverted as instruments of powers by past regimes so that overhauling them will not be an easy task. It has been argued that one way of reforming the bureaucracy and the judiciary is by increasing the salaries of civil servants and judges and by sterilizing them from political intervention. Yet during this time of economic crisis it is clearly not easy to increase government spending to pay for salaries. At the same time while the new government has taken the bold, though some argue rash, step to disband or reduce the size of a number of government departments to promote efficiency and improve the welfare of the remaining civil servants, in reality the government cannot simply lay off large numbers of government employees. One of the first challenges of the new government is to provide for up to 150 000 civil servants who are in danger of losing their secure employment.

Equally worrying is that the move to make the bureaucracy more professional and divorced from practical politics coincide with the increasing power of politicians who are competing against each other to secure the loyalty of the various government ministries under their respective control. Here the President as well as Indonesian society as a whole need to be vigilant so that government ministries are not treated as fiefdoms by the politician ministers and as bases for launching their political campaign in the next general election. Without rigorous scrutiny of government practices the struggle to fight corruption, collusion and nepotism may come to naught as Indonesia enters a new era of competitive politics and big campaign finance.

1999

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